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ABSTRACT

Computing stations networked on wireless LANs (wLANs) typically have a limited
range of mobility: the station must always be within an access point’s coverage area. If a
station moves outside of that area, and if it is unable to locate another base station within its
range to perform a handover of communication connectivity responsibility, then it will ex
perience a disruption in network services until it migrates into the coverage area of another
wLAN. Typical causes for such losses of service include station migration to outside of the
wLAN’s coverage area, changing environmental conditions, and “holes” within the cumu
lative cell coverage area of multiple access points.
There could be several mobile stations simultaneously sharing the network in a
wLAN. Each station may be stationary or in motion for part or all of its service life. How
ever, in order to use the wLAN, it must be within service range of a access point. Theoreti
cally, if a station is outside the access point’s coverage area, yet its own radio signal is
within range of one of the stations which has connectivity with an access point, the isolated
station could relay its network negotiations and traffic through a relay station which has
direct communication with the access point. Therefore, the station nearer to the base sta
tion acts as a relay point for the isolated station out of the access point’s range.
In this thesis, the author proposed, the design of a MAC Frame Relaying Protocol
Extension which enables this type of dynamic relaying of network frames between stations
in wLANs. It requires additional logic in the networking process on both the access point
and the stations involved (both relay station and the isolated station) to support the bidirec
tional forwarding of network traffic, and the definition of several new message types to
xv

support relay connection setup and data exchange. Both cryptography and digital signature
concepts are employed to make secure the process of establishing of a relayed network
session, and the exchange of data between the end stations.
To verify the validity of the protocol extension and to measure its performance, the
protocol extension was implemented into an existing and widely accepted wireless network
standard, IEEE 802.11. To study its effectiveness and impact on the wLAN protocol, the
network simulation software, OPNET, was used. An existing model of IEEE 802.11 was
enhanced with the additional logic introduced by the protocol extension.
Through simulation, it is proved that the logic presented by the protocol extension
is able to function. In addition, the impact to overall network performance, and the quality
of service the isolated station experiences during a relayed network session were quantita
tively analyzed. Through the OPNET simulation, it was found that overall wLAN perfor
mance diminished a moderate amount, while the isolated station experienced a far smaller
level of throughput when engaged in a relayed network session, than it did in a normal
network session.

XVI

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, a software-based MAC frame relaying protocol extension will be pre
sented. It was designed to improve the coverage area of wireless local area networks (wLANs)
that are centrally managed by a network access point. The increase in range is realized
through an associated member station of a wLAN volunteering to share some of its re
sources to relay MAC frames between the access point and the isolated station (a station
that is unable to directly communicate with the access point.) This increase in service range
is gained at the cost of some network performance since more bandwidth i> consumed to
transfer a MAC frame between two end stations.
Because the relaying of MAC frames consumes more bandwidth (in comparison to
direct end-to-end communication), the MAC frame relaying protocol extension is appropri
ate only for temporary rather than permanent use. It is applicable for handling unexpected
situations such as when a wireless station must opera te close to but outside of an established
wLAN coverage area. The protocol extension is very useful when environmental condi
tions and dynamics affect the size of the coverage area, or simply when poor planning has
resulted in holes in the coverage area. Finally, it can provide a larger coverage area with
fewer access points, especially for network administrators with small budgets willing to
sacrifice some performance.
The protocol extension was designed to be comprehensive enough to be applicable
to many wireless local area networking technologies as long as specific requirements by the
original medium access controller are met. The protocol extension introduces new logic to
1
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the wireless medium access control protocol while preserving the original frame layout.
However, several new frame types have been defined. If the original MAC protocol dis
cards unrecognized frame types, then wireless stations without the protocol extension should
continue to function normally within a relay protocol enhanced wLAN.
The focus of this thesis is both the design of the protocol enhancement specification,
and a proof of concept by simulating and modeling the protocol enhancement by applying it
to a well-known wireless LAN MAC protocol developed by the Institute for Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE), IEEE 802.11. Several new MAC frame types were defined in
the protocol extension. Each of the new frame types is essential in establishing and termi
nating a relayed network session, and properly exchanging MAC frames between the access
point and the isolated wireless station. Also addressed is the issue of security. The initial
setup of a relayed network session requires the exchange of secrets which must be protected
by cryptographic means. Relayed frames must also be protected from both forgery and
modification by the relay station and other members of the wLAN. All of these issues were
considered in the design of this protocol extension, which is described in detail in Chapter
2.
To demonstrate the functionality of the protocol extension, IEEE 802.11 was mod
eled to support the new protocol enhancement. The changes to the existing standard, in
cluding new frame type IDs and adjustments to the field header flags are documented in
Chapter 3. To prove that the protocol extension works, and to measure the performance
impact as a result of message relaying, Chapter 4 discusses the changes to an existing simu
lation model of IEEE 802.11 in a network simulation package created by OPNET Tech
nologies, called Optimum Network Performance (OPNET) Modeler.
The results of the simulation are presented in Chapter 5, which explores the impact
of the protocol extension to nearby stations in addition to the station dependent on the
relaying of frames. Overall and individual throughput, end-to-end delay, and network per-
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formance are examined in detail, comparing the performance of a wireless LAN involving
the use of the protocol extension with a network which avoids its use.
Chapter 6 discusses the strengths and possible improvements of the protocol exten
sion, including design considerations and shortcomings which should be addressed in fu
ture research. In Chapter 7, related studies in wireless networking are explored, including a
hardware-based relayed frame system for wireless LANs.
Appendix A provides a glossary of terms used throughout this thesis, including new
terms that were defined throughout the chapters, as well as standard definitions from other
sources. In Appendix B, several finite state diagrams are included to provide a graphicoriented presentation of the many states required by the protocol extension and the transi
tions between each state. Appendix C presents time diagrams which depict the exchange of
relay messages over time.

CHAPTER II
PROTOCOL EXTENSION STRUCTURE

Overview of Protocol Extension Operation
The protocol extension is divided into three phases of operation. The first phase is
the Relayed Connection Establishment phase. In this phase, the isolated station searches
for a wLAN to attempt a relayed network connection by locating nearby stations that are
associated with that network. Once potential relay station candidates are located and iden
tified, the isolated station selects one to function as the relay station. At this point, the
isolated station and the relay station establishes their segment of the relay protocol exten
sion. The isolated station may then proceed to negotiate a relayed network session with the
access point, with the relay station forwarding connection setup frames in between the two
end points. If the result of the secrets exchanged between the access point and the isolated
station yields positive, then a relayed network session is completely established.
The second phase of the extension protocol is the Relayed Network Service phase.
In this phase, control, data, and management frames are exchanged between the isolated
station and the access point, through the relay station. The system remains in this phase
until one of the three stations decides to terminate its participation in the relayed network
session.
The third and final phase, the Relayed Session Termination phase, is executed when
one of the three participating stations initiate the termination of its involvement in the wire
less frame relaying session. This clears all session state information and releases all partici
pants from the relayed network session.
4
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Determining When the Protocol Extension Should Be Invoked
As stated previously, this protocol extension is designed to provide temporary ex
tended range access to a wLAN for situations when an isolated station is unable to establish
direct communication with an access point. Obstacles (such as a door, a wall, or even the
contour of the building) may change the characteristics of radio signal propagation causing
irregularities in the coverage area. Environmental conditions such as rain, introduce addi
tional resistance to the signal propagation, diminishing the wLAN’s effective range. [Ge99]
A station should only attempt to establish a network session through the relayed
frame protocol extension after failing to locate an access point to associate with under its
normal network operation. The relayed frame protocol extension is less efficient than the
original protocol based on both resource efficiency and throughput. This is because the
relaying of frames requires additional bandwidth and incurs longer delays than direct com
munication with the access point. The additional consumption of bandwidth is the result of
network traffic transmitted to the relay station (the logical bridge between the access point
and the station outside of communications range), which is then forwarded to its final des
tination. The increase in delay is the result of the forwarding propagation time plus process
ing delays incurred at the relay station.
For these reasons, the protocol extension is recommended only for temporary and
emergency purposes, and not for long-term use or as a permanent addition to a wLAN
infrastructure.
Minimum Requirements for Extensibility of Original Wireless LAN Technology
The protocol extension will work only on wireless network interface hardware that
meets the following minimum requirements:
1)

Broadcast frames must be supported. When the isolated station begins its

search for prospective relay stations, it may not be aware of all of its neighboring wireless

6

stations. Therefore, a broadcast message carrying the request for initiating a relayed net
work session is transmitted to find the best candidate for a relay station.
2)

Acknowledged peer-to-peer frame exchanges must be supported. Since wire

less media is more error-prone than wired media, acknowledgments must be utilized to
ensure that frames are successfully transmitted. The protocol extension is synchronous and
requires that packets are transmitted successfully between the access point and the isolated
station and in the proper order.
3)

The MAC frame header must have sufficient unallocated bit field patterns.

The protocol extension introduces several new messages that require unique frames to trans
port relay-specific data.
4)

Asynchronous access to the wireless media must be supported. Since the

isolated station is located outside of the access point's coverage area, the relay station must
be able to receive frames originating from a source that do not have control of the network.
5)

The access point must be able to receive frames that are not directly ad

dressed to it, as well as be able to transmit frames with a different originator address. This
is necessary to compensate for the hidden node problem, where the isolated station is out of
radio range of other members of the wLAN with which it has a relayed network session.
[Di96, Ge99]
Pre-Protocol Extension Execution Configuration
Before a wireless isolated station attempts a relayed frame network session, it must
have a list of the wireless LANs to which it has access privileges in order to engage the
protocol extension. This list is called the NAP List. Each entry in the NAP List is indexed
by the physical address of the access point controlling a particular wLAN; the entry con
tains information that the isolated station needs to establish a relayed frame session with
that access point. The information includes, but is not limited to:
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• The physical characteristics of the wLAN. The isolated station needs this informa
tion in order to properly synchronize and communicate with the stations associated with the
wLAN. For example, network data rate, radio frequency, and hopping sequences (for Fre
quency Hopping Spread Spectrum networks). [Ge99, Di84]
• A public key, identified as CKPu , that has been issued to the isolated station. This
key is used to encrypt authentication information exchanged between the isolated station
and the wLAN’s access point. Only the access point has the private key which can decrypt
the ciphertext generated by the isolated station. This key is used only during the connection
setup phase of a relayed network session.
• A private key, identified as CKPr , that has been previously issued to the isolated
station. This key is used to decrypt authentication information transmitted to the isolated
station from the wLAN’s access point. Only the access point has the public key which can
encrypt the ciphertext so that no entity can transmit false authentication information to the
isolated station. This key is used only during the connection setup phase of a relayed net
work session.
• Another private key, identified as DSKPr■, that has been previously issued to the
isolated station. This key is used to generate a digital signature which the access point
examines to validate authentication messages transmitted by the isolated station. The ac
cess point has the corresponding public key which verifies the authenticity of the digital
signature. This key is used only during the connection setup phase of a relayed network
session.
• Another public key, identified as DSKPut., that has been issued to the isolated
station. This key is used to validate the digitai signature stamped onto authentication mes
sages from the access point. Only the access point has the private key which matches the
public key held by the isolated station. This key is used only during the connection setup
phase of a relayed network session.

8

8 A password, passphrase, or some other form of secret. This is transmitted to the
access point during the relayed network session establishment phase which proves the iso
lated station’s identity to the access point.
The access point also needs a list to store information about the wireless stations
that could attempt a relayed frame network session. This list is called the Relayed Frame
Clients List. Each entry is indexed by the physical address of the supported isolated station.
The information contained in the list entry must have at least the following entries:
r,

8 A public key, identified as CKPun> that has been issued to the access point. This
key is used to encrypt authentication information exchanged between the access point and
the isolated station referenced by the list entry. Only the isolated station has the private key
which can decrypt the ciphertext generated by the access point. This key is used only
during the connection setup phase of a relayed network session.
8 A private key, identified as CKPr x. that has been issued to the access point. This
key is used to decrypt authentication information transmitted to the access point from the
isolated station referenced by this list entry. The isolated station has the public key which
can encrypt the ciphertext so that no entity can obtain the secrets passed to the access point
through relayed network connection setup messages. This key is used only during the con
nection setup phase of a relayed network session.
* Another private key, identified as DS KPr r, that has been previously issued to the
access point. This key is used to generate a digital signature which the isolated station
examines to validate authentication messages transmitted by the access point. The isolated
station has the corresponding public key which verifies the authenticity of the digital signa
ture. This key is used only during the connection setup phase of a relayed network session.
8 Another public key, identified as DSKPu ix. that has been previously issued to the
access point. This key is used to validate the digital signature stamped onto authentication
messages from the isolated station. Only the isolated station has the private key which
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matches the public key held by the access point. This key is used only during the connec
tion setup phase of a relayed network session.
• A password, passphrase, or some other form of secret which is required by the
access point to verify the identity of the isolated station.
Phase 1: Establishment of a Relayed Frame Network Session
Upon invoking the protocol extension, the NAP Entry Pointer is initialized to the
first entry in the NAP List. Each time the index in the NAP Entry Pointer is advanced, a
counter, NAP Retry Counter, is reset. The task of this counter is to prevent the protocol
extension from making too many unsuccessful relayed network session connection attempts
with a particular wLAN. Its default value, however, should still allow enough retries to
counteract the effects of message loss as a result of frame collision.
The isolated station (from here on referred to as S.), then configures the network
interface’s medium access hardware to conform to the physical properties of the access
point that manages the wLAN that is stored in the list entry. If the radio encoding technique
requires synchronization with peer stations (such as Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
[Di84, Ge99]), S. listens for the network traffic of neighboring wireless stations and at
tempts to synchronize itself with them; some of these stations are potential relay station
candidates if they are members of the target wLAN. If the encoding technique requires
synchronization, and if S. cannot synchronize itself with peer members of the target LAN,
then the attempt to activate the protocol extension for that NAP Entry is aborted. The NAP
Entry Pointer is advanced to the next entry in the NAP List, and the synchronization process
is attempted again.
If there are no complications with S.‘s ability to exchange messages with its neigh
boring stations (for example, S. failing to synchronize with nearby stations using FHSS), S.
then attempts to establish a relayed communication session between itself and a relay sta

10

tion with a series of messages defined for this purpose. A timeline of the message exchange
is portrayed in Figure 2-1.

S. begins the attempt by broadcasting a Request fo r Service (RFS) message to all of
the stations within transmission range belonging to the target wLAN. The RFS message
alerts receiving wireless stations that the broadcasting station is searching for a station to
serve as a relay station in a relayed network session.
S. initializes a timer, Max RRFS Wait, immediately after broadcasting the RFS mes
sage. This timer is necessary to limit the amount of time S. spends waiting for a response,
protecting it from indefinitely waiting should no station issue a response. If the timer ex
pires, S. decrements the NAP Retn: Counter. If the counter is greater than zero, it rebroad
casts the RFS message. Otherwise, if the NAP Retry Counter reaches zero, then it assumes
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that the vvLAN S. is attempting to join is either not within range or is in a state that does not
allow any additional relayed network sessions. Sj then selects the next wLAN in its NAP
List. If the NAP Entry Pointer had already addressed the last entry in the list, then the
protocol extension aborts, and reports a connection failure.
If at least one station responded to the RFS message, then S. proceeds with the next
step of the protocol extension setup. Any further responses to the RFS message are dis
carded after this point in the connection setup phase.
The default value for the Max RRFS Wait timer provides enough time for the RFS
message to propagate through the wireless medium to all potential relay stations within
range, for any receiving station to absorb the message and process it (including any decision
making processes), and for any stations that wish to respond to the RFS to transmit their
response (including consideration for medium access contention.) The default value for the
Max RRFS Wait timer, however, cannot be too large of a value such that early responders to
the RFS message may quit waiting for a response message from S.. This would indicate
which responding station has been chosen to serve as the relay station.
The suggested format of the Request fo r Service message is specified in Figure 2-2.

A xiD
Figure 2-2: Request for Service (RFS) message format
The field AJD identifies the access point of the target w'LAN, which is typically its
hardware address. Additional fields, such as minimum network quality of service require
ments information, may be encoded in the message.
This broadcast alerts the wireless stations that received the RFS message that there
is a station seeking to join the wLAN through the relayed frame protocol extension. The
receiving stations examine the AJD field encoded in the RFS message. If it does not match
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the identity of the access point with which the station is associated, the receiving station
discards the RFS message and does not transmit a response.
If the A ID field matches the identity of the access point to which the receiving
station is associated, it may elect to respond, thereby declaring itself a candidate relay sta
tion. The simplest implementation of the receiving station’s decision-making process may
either be ‘yes', if the station unconditionally decides to provide relay station services to
other wireless stations, or ‘no’, if the station unconditionally decides not to. A more mature
implementation for determining whether or not to respond to the RFS message may con
sider factors such as:
• Can the receiving station handle the additional load on its limited resources as a
result of serving as a relay station? The protocol extension’s logic requires an additional
examination of the frame header to determine if the frame is actually addressed to itself or
to another station through itself; this effort increases the wLAN device driver’s demand for
CPU time. If it is a relayed frame, then it might have to temporarily cache the frame until
other relayed frames arrive; this creates an extra burden on the station’s memory resources.
Finally, the relay station will need to forward the received frame(s) to their final destination.
This decreases the availability of the network bandwidth for the relay station’s own needs.
• Can the receiving station handle the additional power usage demanded by the wire
less frame relay protocol extension? Because S. is outside the range of the access point, any
centralized power savings management techniques by the access point might be rendered
unusable. The inability to temporarily power down the antenna due to the risk of losing any
pending messages from S. can conceivably shorten the battery life of a relay station.
• Is the receiving station significantly mobile? If the wireless station reassociates
frequently with other wLANs, then it would be a bad candidate for a relay station. A relay
station that reassociates with another wLAN will terminate the relayed network session

between the isolated station and the access point. A less mobile or fixed station is therefore
more desirable than a considerably more mobile station.
• Can the network handle the additional overhead that the relaying protocol exten
sion generates? Each frame transported through the relayed network session is transmitted
twice; the stations within communication range of Si and the relay station will sense that the
wireless medium is twice as active for the same message than what would be experienced if
Si was within normal range of the access point.
If the receiving station elects to declare its candidacy as a relay station, it constructs
and transmits a Response to Request fo r Sen’ice (RRFS) message to S.. The suggested
format of the RRFS message is described in Figure 2-3.

A X!D

S ta tu s (S x i) S ta tu s (N e tw o rk )

S ta tu s (L o c S ta b ility )

Figure 2-3: Response to Request for Service (RRFS) message format

The A ID field identifies the access point that the responding station is associated
with, to verify that the RRFS message originated from a station that is a member of the
current target wLAN. The field Status(Sxi) provides S. with information about the qualifica
tions of the responding station as a relay station. The information contained in the field may
be a simple fitness value calculated by the responding station. It may also be a series of
values describing the capabilities of the responder. The field Status(Network) describes, in
a similar fashion, the state of the wLAN from the responder’s perspective. Finally, the field
Status(LocStability) describes how stable the responder is in regards to its location and its
relationship with both the access point and S.. If the station is always in a fixed location, a
non-mobile flag could be set to state this condition. If a short history of signal strength
between the access point and the responding station is available, Status(LocStablity) could
report the average signal strength along with its standard deviation. The signal strength of
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the RFS message is another factor which may be stored in Status(LocStability). This pro
vides S. with an idea as to which potential relay stations enjoy the best receiving signal-tonoise ratio.
Tne responding station initializes a timer. Max ARS Wait, immediately after trans
mitting the RRFS message. The purpose of this timer is to establish a life-span on the state
information that the responding station maintains while waiting for a reply from S. for a
given RFS message. This prevents the station from indefinitely allocating resources for
those isolated stations which may never choose the responder as a relay station. If the timer
expires and there was no response from S., then any state information regarding S.‘s relayed
network connection setup request is discarded. The timer is reset if another RFS message is
received from S.. The default value of Max ARS Wait allows enough time for Sj to evaluate
the prospective relay stations, and time for S. to generate a response message.
Additional information about the responding stations that are not stored in the RRFS
message may be gathered and should be considered when S. chooses a responder for its
relay station. For example, the signal strength is an important consideration when choosing
a responding station to serve as a relay station. It is more desirable to choose a station with
a clear, strong signal and a high signal-to-noise ratio, than a weak signal and a low signal-tonoise ratio that could be more prone to errors. [Ge99]
As S. receives multiple RRFS messages from the responding stations, it stores them
in an ordered list, called the Responding Relay Station Candidates List (RRSCL). This list
is sorted either by FIFO, or by a computed level of fitness. After the Max RRFS Wait timer
has expired (which occurs before the Max ARS Wait timer on any of the responding stations
has expired), S. chooses the first entry in the RRSCL as the first responder to complete the
Isolated Station to Relay Station relationship of the protocol extension. S. signals the cho
sen responding station by transmitting an Acceptance o f Relaying Service (ARS) message
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to it. The ARS message does not carry any field information in its payload. The frame type
ID and the origination address fields provide the chosen station with sufficient information.
S. initiates a timer, Max ARS_ACK Wait, immediately after transmitting the ARS
message. This timer is used to establish a limit on how long S. will wait for a response from
its chosen candidate relay station. The default value of Max ARS_ACK Wait is long enough
to accommodate the transmission of the ARS message, time for the chosen relay station to
absorb and process the message, and for the responding station to transmit a reply. If this is
the first time S. transmitted an ARS message to the currently chosen responding station, the
counter ARS Retry Counter is initialized. If the timer expires, S. decrements ARS Retry
Counter. If ARS Retry Counter has a value greater than zero, it retransmits the ARS mes
sage and waits for a reply. If the counter reaches zero, then it assumes that there is a prob
lem with the currently chosen candidate station, and the next entry in the RRSCL is se
lected. If S. exhausts every entry in the RRSCL, it decrements the NAP Retry Counter, and
considers the failure at this stage of the protocol extension as similar to not receiving any
responses to an RFS message.
If the wireless station that received the ARS message cannot find any state informa
tion about a potential relayed network session with S. (which may occur if the receiving
station has reinitialized itself or if the Max ARS Wait timer has expired), it simply discards
the message. Otherwise, if state information about S. is found, then the receiving station
cancels the Max ARS Wait timer. The chosen responding station (from here on referred to as
S J , then transmits an Acceptance o f Relaying Service Acknowledgment (ARS_ACK) mes
sage back to S., and cancels the Max ARS Wait timer. There is no timer set by Sxi to ensure
that S. received the ARS_ACK message. If S. transmits another ARS message, Sxj simply
responds with another ARS_ACK message Like the ARS message, the ARS_ACK mes
sage is defined only by the frame type ID and the origination address fields. These fields
provide the chosen station with sufficient information.
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The first phase of the relayed connection setup is complete when S; receives the
ARS_ACK message. At this point in the protocol extension execution, S. and Sxi have
established a relayed network session between each other, enabling S. the ability to negoti
ate a relayed network session with the access point through Sxi.
In the second phase of the relayed connection setup process, more connection setup
messages are exchanged: between the isolated station and the access point, with the relay
station in the middle forwarding the messages from one end point to the other. Figure 2-4
provides a timeline of all of the connection setup messages exchanged in this phase.
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Figure 2-4: Timeline of message exchange for negotiations between S. and A.x.
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S. begins negotiation with the access point (from here on referred to as Ax) by trans
mitting a Request fo r Relayed Communication Session (RRCS) message to Sxj. After vali
dating that there is an active relay session between S. and itself, Sxj forwards the RRCS
message on to Ax. The suggested format for the RRCS message is illustrated in Figure 2-5.

d s ig

S jID

S ta tu s (S i)

enc

Rsi

P W (S j)

Figure 2-5: Request for Relayed Communication Session (RRCS) message format
The SID field is set to the hardware address of S.. Ax uses this unique address in a
key field search to locate S.’s entry in its Relayed Frame Clients List. Status(S.) contains
optional status information regarding S.. It may be used for declaring Quality of Service
requirements or other information useful in Ax‘s decision in determining if it should grant a
relayed network session to S..
PW(S.) is a secret known only between S. and Ax. This secret is proof to Axthat the
station claiming to be S. is indeed S., and not some other entity that is pretending to be Sr
The field R contains a random number generated by S.. The random number and password
fields form the plaintext which is encrypted with the key CKPusi. The resulting ciphertext is
denoted in Figure 2-5 as enc, which graphically encapsulates Rsi and PW(S.). The random
number is introduced into the ciphertext to prevent a cryptographic attack known as the
“Man in the Middle Attack”. This attack is discussed in this chapter under the section “A
Survey of Authentication and Cryptography used in the Protocol Extension”.
In addition to public-key cryptography, the protocol extension relies on digital sig
nature technology to decrease the likelihood of an unauthorized wireless station launching
a successful attack. The use of digital signatures prevents the relay station (or any other
station which is authenticated to the wLAN) from modifying the RRCS and other similarly
protected messages. To generate a signature, a hash of the concatenation of the fields SID,

1
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Status(S), and enc, is signed with DSKPrsj. The resulting signature is stored in the dsig
field.
S, initiates a timer, Max RRCS Wait, immediately after transmitting the RRCS mes
sage. This timer enforces a ceiling on the amount of time that S. waits for a response from
Ax. The default value assigned to the timer takes into consideration the sum of the propaga
tion delays experienced by the RRCS message as it passes from S. to Sxj, and from Sxi to Ax.
The timer also takes into consideration not only the time Axneeds to process the connection
request attempt, but also the propagation delays experienced by the response message as it
traverses from Ax to S. through Sxi. Additionally, the busyness of the network is factored
into the timer’s initial value, providing compensation for the delays incurred by waiting for
an open time slot on a busy network or by retransmitting a frame in the event of a frame
collision.
In conjunction with the timer, the counter RRCS Retry Counter is utilized to manage
the number of retry attempts tried by S.. The RRCS Retry counter is initialized to a default
value, and decremented each time the RRCS message is transmitted. If the counter reaches
zero, S; concludes that something is wrong with the network and that further connection
establishment attempts with this particular wLAN will unlikely to yield a successful con
nection. S. then transmits a Terminate Relay Session (TRS) message to S . The format of
the TRS message is described in Figure 2-6.

S jID

Figure 2-6: Terminate Relay Session (TRS) message format
The TRS message contains only a single field, S.JD, which identifies which S. the
message is targeted for.
The reception of a TRS message notifies Sxi that the relayed connection session has
been terminated, releasing Sxi from its relaying station responsibilities. S. then advances its
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NAP Entry Pointer to the next entry and tries again. If there are no furthei entries in the list,
then a connection error should be reported and the protocol extension terminated. Since the
message originated from S;, and Sxi has not observed the completion of a relayed network
session between S. and A , the TRS message is not forwarded to A x.
The reception of an RRCS message notifies Ax that there exists a wireless station
(S,) located outside of the coverage area, that has already established the initial relayed
network session protocol with a member of its wLAN (Sxi), and that wishes to associate
with the wLAN through the relayed frame protocol extension. Av then determines if the
message is legitimate (i.e., not forged or modified during transport). If it is valid, Axdecides
if a relayed network session should be granted to S..
The verification process involves a series of “challenges” to ensure the authenticity
of the relayed network session setup request. The first challenge is the verification of the
digital signature supplied in the dsig field in the RRCS message. If the hash of the concat
enation of the RRCS fields SID, Status(S.), and enc does not match the same value retrieved
from dsig after it has been decrypted with DSKPnar, then the message is considered to have
been tampered. Axdiscards the message, and transmits a TRS message back to Sxi, and
copies the value in the RRCS’s SID field into the SID field of the TRS message.
If the digital signature matches, but the enc field cannot be decrypted with CKPrm,
or, if the enc field can be decrypted, but the PW(S.) field does not contain the secrets that Ax
expects, a TRS message is sent back to S. through S .. Axwill never grant a relayed network
session to S. if any of the three previous events occur.
The reception of a TRS message notifies Sx. that the relayed connection session has
been terminated, releasing Sxi from its relaying station responsibilities. Since the TRS mes
sage originated from A , Sxi forwards the TRS message to the S. specified in the SID field
before clearing the state information containing the relayed network session between Sxi
and S.. Once S. receives the TRS message, it advances its NAP Entry Pointer to the next
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entry and tries again. If there are no further entries in the list, then a connection error is
reported and the protocol extension is terminated.
On the other hand, if the digital signature and the secrets provided by Sj are valid, Ax
may proceed to deciding whether or not to grant S_ a relayed network session.
The process of deciding whether a relayed network session should be granted to Si
could be as simple as an unconditional 'yes’ or ‘no’. A more mature decision-making pro
cess for determining whether or not Axshould grant Si a relayed network session considers
factors such as:
• If S. specified a minimum level of Quality of Service, can the network guarantee it
throughout the duration of the relayed network session?
• Can the access point handle the additional load? If Ax has been experiencing high
utilization for significant periods in its history, the addition of a new station to the wLAN
could increase the load level, which would yield longer delays.
• Can the network handle the additional traffic? Stations that are members of a
network with a significantly high load will experience significant additional delays caused
by medium access contention and the recovery of lost packets resulting from frame colli
sions. A relayed network session could aggravate an already congested network (wLAN)
through the necessary transmission of a relayed data frame as it finds its way to its destina
tion end-station.
If A, elects to deny the authenticated/validated S. a relayed network session, it pre
pares a Relayed Communication Denied (RCD) message. The purpose of the RCD mes
sage is to notify S. that its connection request has been denied, so that any resources in
volved in the existing connection setup between S. and S . may be released. The suggested
format for the RCD message is depicted in Figure 2-7.
The SID field is set to the same value as the SJD in the RRCS message that A
received earlier. This field is necessary since Sxj could potentially be serving multiple iso-
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Rsi

S ta tu s (A x )

Figure 2-7: Relayed Communication Denied (RCD) message format
Iated stations, and requires some address field to p r o p e r l y route the message to its destina
tion. 1he Field Ru is assigned the random number initially generated by S . This randomizes
the message’s ciphertext as well as reduces the likelihood of having an external attacker
transmit an RCD message to S. with the intention of disrupting the relay protocol. The Field
Status(AJ provides optional status information, such as the reason why the relayed network
connection request was denied. The fields R . and Status(AJ combine to form the plaintext
which is encrypted with the key CKPuax. The resulting ciphertext is denoted in Figure 2-7
as enc, which graphically encapsulates the protected Fields.
Like the RRCS message, the RCD message makes use of a digital signature to pro
tect it from unauthorized modiFication. A hash is calculated from the concatenation of the
SID and enc Fields. This hash is then encrypted with the key DSKPrix, creating the message’s
digital signature which is stored in the message’s dsig Field. The RCD message is then
transmitted to the relay station, Sxi, which forwarded the original RRCS message. No tim
ers or counters are initialized since Avdoes not expect any further messages on behalf of S..
When S receives an RCD message, it examines the address stored in its SID Field.
If the address does not match the address of any S. which the station has agreed to provide
relay station, services to, it simply discards the message. On the other hand, if there is a
match, the RCD message is forwarded on to S.. After successfully forwarding the RCD
message, Sxj clears itself of all state information regarding the relay session. Sxi no longer is
responsible for forwarding messages on behalf of Sr After S. receives and validates the
RCD message using DSKPusj, it clears itself of any relayed network session state informa
tion generated for A , and advance its NAP Entry Pointer to the next list entry. If there are no
further entries in the list, a connection error should be reported, and the protocol extension
terminates.
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Alternatively, if Ax decides to grant S. a relayed network session, it prepares a Re
sponse to Relayed Communication Session (RsRCS) message. The purpose of the RsRCS
message is to notify

that its connection request has been accepted, and to provide a secret,

symmetric digital signature key which is to be used for signing messages after the relayed
network session establishment has completed. The suggested format for the RsRCS mes
sage is displayed in Figure 2-8.
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Figure 2-8: Response to Relayed Communication Session (RsRCS) message format
The RsRCS message carries many of the fields which are present in the RCD mes
sage. The SJD field is set to the same value as the S.ID in the RRCS so that Sxi can properly
route the RsRCS message to its destination. Status(AJ carries optional information regard
ing the status of Ax and the network that it manages. The Rs. field is assigned the random
number that was initially generated by S., to provide assurance to the isolated station that
the RsRCS message is the response for its most recent relayed network session attempt in
addition to its normal role of randomizing the ciphertext.
A also generates a random number which is stored in the R field. An added purpose of this random number is to further differentiate the current connection establishment
message exchanges from past exchanges, to make it less likely that a previous exchange of
relayed network session connection messages could interrupt the current connection setup
message exchange.
To decrease the amount of time taken by an end station when generating a digital
signature for messages in the Relayed Data Transport protocol phase, Ax generates a new
digital signature key, DSKS. This key is different for each and every relayed network ses
sion, using a symmetric encryption algorithm as opposed to a public key algorithm. A
symmetric key algorithm is more desirable for the duration of an established relayed net

work session because it is much faster than a public key algorithm. [Sc96] Using a new key
also helps in detouring cryptoanalysts who have managed to break the keys from previous
sessions from using them to forge messages in the current relayed network session. This
new symmetric digital signature key is stored in the field DSKS.
The fields /? ,, R , and DSKS, are combined to form the plaintext which Axencrypts
with CKPuax. The resulting ciphertext is stored in the enc field. The hash of the concatena
tion of the fields SJD. Status(A ), and enc, is encrypted with DSKPrn, forming the digital
signature of the message which is stored in the dsig field.
Once the RsRCS message has been generated, it is then transmitted to the relay
station, Sxi, which forwarded the original RRCS message to Ax. Unlike the RCD message,
Ax requires a timer Max RsRCS Wait to limit how long it should maintain the relay session
setup information for S. while it waits for an acknowledgment of Ax granting a relayed
network session. The default value for the Max RsRCS Wait timer is large enough to accom
modate the time the RsRCS message requires to propagate through Svj to S., and takes into
consideration the busyness of the network and Sxi. The time for S. to absorb and process the
RsRCS message is accounted for, as well as the propagation time for its response message
while it is relayed back to Ax. If the Max RsRCS Wait timer expires without a response from
S., Ax discards all relay session setup information for S., From this point, S. will have to
resend the RRCS message to begin the process again.
After receiving the RsRCS message, Sxi examines the address stored in the S.ID
field. If the address does not match the address of any S. to which the station has agreed to
provide relay station services, it simply discards the message. On the other hand, if there is
a match, the RsRCS message is forwarded on to S.. Unlike the reception of a RCD frame,
Sxj retains its relayed network session information for S..
After a successful reception of the RsRCS message, S. validates the message with
the digital signature stored in the dsig field. If the hash of S JD, Status(A ), and enc does not
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equal the hash extracted from dsig after it has been decrypted with DSKPut., the message is
discarded. Otherwise, the message is considered untampered. The ciphertext in the enc
field is decrypted CKPr ., and the Rx. field’s value is compared with S.’s record of the ran
dom number it had generated for the RRCS message. If the numbers fail to match, then the
RsRCS message received is not a valid response message for the current relayed network
session S; is attempting to establish. The message is then discarded without resetting the
Max RRCS Wait timer.
In the event that the RsRCS message received is authentic, the contents of the mes
sage are extracted and stored in the relayed network session state information maintained
by S.. S. notifies Ax that it successfully received the RsRCS message before Ax’s Max
RsRCS Wait timer expires. This notification to Ax is transported through an Acknowledg
ment o f Relayed Communication Session (ARCS) message. The format for the ARCS mes
sage is depicted in Figure 2-9.
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Figure 2-9: Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session (ARCS) message format
S.’s hardware address is stored into the SID field, required for Ax to properly iden
tify the originator. The Rax field is set to the value of the random number generated by Ax,
which S. received in the earlier RsRCS message, proving to the access point that this ARCS
is intended for the current relayed network connection setup phase. Rm is encrypted with
CKPux. and the resulting ciphertext is stored in the enc field. A hash of SID and enc is
generated and is then encrypted with DSKPr., creating a digital signature for the message
which is stored in the dsig field. S. then transmits the ARCS message to Sxi, which is then
forwarded to A .
X

S. initializes a timer, Max ARCS Wait, in order to place a ceiling on the amount of
time the station spends waiting for Av to transmit its response. The default value of the
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timer takes into consideration the amount of time required for ARCS to propagate through
the network to Sxi, and then to Ax. The time for Ax to absorb and process the message is
taken into consideration, especially when significant load is reported in the RsRCS message’s
Status(AJ field. Finally, the response propagation time between Axand Sxj, and finally from
Sxi. to Sr , are also considered. A counter, ARCS Retry- Counter, is initialized to a default value
on the first transmission, and is decremented each instance the timer expires when a re
sponse was not received from Ax. If the counter is greater than zero, S. retransmits the
ARCS message. Otherwise, if the counter reaches zero, S. falls back to the previous stage,
transmitting an RRCS message to Sxi, which in turn is forwarded on to Ax.
If Ax receives the ARCS message before its Max RsRCS Wait timer expires, it veri
fies that the message is authentic by challenging the digital signature in the dsig field. If the
hash of SID and enc fail to match the hash recovered from the decryption of dsig with
DSKPu , the message is discarded. The Rax field is extracted from the ciphertext in the enc
field (using CKPr^), and compared with the random number which Axgenerated earlier. If
the numbers do not match, the message is discarded. Otherwise, at this point, Ax may
consider the relayed network session between itself and S. to be complete, and data frames
may be transported through Sxi between the two end stations. Ax signals S. that the relayed
network session protocols has been completed by issuing it an acknowledgment to the ARCS
message. This message is carried in the Acceptance o f Relayed Communication Session
Acknowledgment (AJRCS_ACK) message. The format for this message is described in Fig
ure 2-10.
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Figure 2-10: Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session Acknowledgment
(ARCS_ACK) message format
S.’s hardware address is stored into the SID field, required for Sxi to properly iden
tify the message’s final destination. The R field is set to the value of the random number
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generated by S , which Axreceived in the earlier RRCS message, proving to the access point
that this ARCS_ACK is intended for the current relayed network connection setup phase.
/?h. is encrypted with CKPun and the resulting ciphertext is stored in the enc field. A hash is
generated from the concatenation of the S.ID and enc fields; this hash is encrypted with
DSKPrn to form the message’s digital signature, and is stored in the dsig field. Ax then
transmits the ARCS_ACK message to Sxi, which in turn forwards the message on to S.. Ax
does not initialize any further counters or timers; if S. fails to receive the ARCS_ACK mes
sage, it will retransmit the ARCS message.
Once S. receives the ARCS_ACK message, it should confirm its authenticity through
checking its digital signature. If the hash of SID and enc does not match the hash obtained
from dsig after it has been decrypted with DSKPu^., the message should be discarded. After
the digital signature has been confirmed, Rr. is extracted from the enc field (which is de
crypted with CKPrJ, and compared with the R that S. generated for the earlier RRCS
message. If the numbers do not match, the ARCS_ACK frame is discarded; the ARCS
message is transmitted to Ax again once the Max ARCS Wait timer expires and if the counter
ARCS Retry Counter is still greater than zero. Otherwise, the relayed network session be
tween S. and Ax is considered successfully established. Data frames may now be trans
ported through the relayed protocol extension.
Phase 2: Relayed Data Transport
The transport of data frames through the relayed frame protocol extension is a sim
pler process than the relayed network session establishment process. The protocol exten
sion defines two different relay data frames:
9 The Relay Data Frame Class 0 (RDFO) message
• The Relay Data Frame Class 1 (RDF1) message.
The RDF1 message can transport relay descriptor data inside its payload block along
with the upper layer data, while the RDFO message instead relies on a descriptor message,
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the Relayed Frame Information (RFI) Message to transport relay data. The RFI message is
transmitted immediately after an RDFO message.
If the original MAC frame has a field which denotes the amount of data in the frame’s
payload block and if there is sufficient free space in the payload block, an RDF1 message
may be used to transport data through the relayed network session. The payload length field
remains unchanged, stating the size of the upper layer data that it is transporting. However,
immediately after the last octet of data in the payload block, additional relay data is in
serted. The receiving station is able to locate this data by recognizing the RDF1 frame and
addressing the fixed-size data following the last octet. The format of the embedded relay
data is described in Figure 2-11.
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Figure 2-11: Relay Frame Descriptor Data
The SID field is set to the physical address of S.. If the originating station is S., this
field is necer ary for Sx. to validate that the RDF1 frame originated from an expected source
(a station which has previously established a relayed network session through itself), and
for Ax to determine the originator of the message for its own frame reception processing.
On the other hand, if the originating station is Ax, the SID field is required by Sxi to deter
mine if that station has a relayed network session established through it, and if it does, to
forward the message to its final destination.
Because the relay protocol must transport frames through a relay station, the Src/
Dest field is required to preserve the true source or destination address of the relay station.
For an RDF1 message to be transmitted to S. from A , this field contains the address of the
frame's originator, since the SID field provides adequate information for Sxi to determine its
final destination. If the RDF1 message originated from S., the final destination address of
the message is stored in the Src/Dest field.
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The contents of the payload, including the attached SID and Src/Dest fields, must
be protected from unauthorized modifications during its transport between the end stations.
A hash of the concatenation of these fields is generated, and is then encrypted with DSKS to
create the message’s digital signature. This signature is stored in the dsig field.
If the original MAC frame does not have a field that denotes the amount of data in
the frame’s payload block, or if it does, but there is insufficient free space in the payload
block, an RDFO message must be used to transport data through the relayed network ses
sion. The data frame is structured the same as an unmodified data frame in the original
wLAN architecture, with the exception that the frame is identified as a RDFO frame rather
than a standard MAC data frame.
A hash of the RDFO message’s payload is generated and then encrypted with DSKS,
creating a digital signature. This signature, along with the final destination of the frame,
and a unique identifier (such as the RDFO message’s frame sequence number) is stored in a
queue called the Outgoing Relay Queue. Entries are added to and removed from the queue
on a First-In First-Out (FIFO) order. Ax has one Outgoing Relay Queue for each S. with an
active relayed network session.
An RDFO or an RDF1 message that was generated by either A yor S., is eligible to
enter the wLAN hardware’s transmitter queue. Before an RDF1 message is placed into the
transmitter queue, the end station checks the contents of the Outgoing Relay Queue. If the
queue is empty, the RDF1 message is immediately placed into the transmitter queue. How
ever, if the queue has at least one entry, an RFI message is generated and placed into the
transmitter queue ahead of the RDF1 message in order to preserve the FIFO order that the
relayed protocol extension uses to transport relayed data frames.
If the message is an RDFO message, it is placed immediately into the transmitter
queue. The end station then checks the length of the Outgoing Relay Queue. If the number
of entries in the queue (including the RDFO message just placed into the transmitter queue)
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is equal to the constant Max Outgoing Relay Queue Length, then an RFI message is gener
ated and placed in the transmitter queue immediately after the RDFO message. The Max
Outgoing Relay Queue Length constant is set to a value large enough to promote efficient
use of the wireless bandwidth without further increasing relay delays due to time spent by
the relay station and destination end station waiting for relay data frame descriptor data.
This constant is also necessary to prevent too many RDFO message from being transmitted
ahead such that the RFI message cannot carry enough descriptor information about the
messages which preceded it in its payload block.
Although there is an upper bound to the number of previously transmitted RDFO
messages waiting for the RFI message, there is another potential source of messaging delay.
This delay occurs when packets from the network layers above the MAC layer arrive at a
very slow rate. The Outgoing Relay Queue may fill up too slowly, causing time-out prob
lems for the upper layers. To alleviate this problem, an upper bound is placed on the amount
of time that may pass between the first transmission of an RDFO message and its corre
sponding RFI message. After the queue is cleared, and a new relayed data frame descriptor
entry is placed into the queue, a timer, Force RFI Timer, is initialized to a default value and
started. The default value is set to a reasonable value to prevent upper layer time-outs, i.e.,
it is highly dependent on the nature of the behavior of the upper layers. If the timer expires
before the number of entries in the queue reaches Max Outgoing Relay Queue Length, then
an RFI message is automatically generated to pass the descriptor data for the entries waiting
in the queue. The timer is stopped whenever an RFI message is generated. The format of
the RFI message is portrayed in Figure 2-12.
# Entries

S jID

| S rc/D e s t

dsig

...

PkID

Figure 2-12: Relayed Frame Information (RFI) message format
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The field, # Entries, contains the number of relay data frame descriptors that are
carried in the RFI message. Each descriptor provides relaying information about the RDFO
messages which were transmitted ahead of the RFI message.
If the RFI message originates from Ax, the S ID is set to the target Si and the Src/Dest
Field is set to the address of the frame’s originator. If the originator is Sjt S./D is set to its
own hardware address, and the Src/Dest field is set to the final destination for the packet it
is describing. The dsig field for each descriptor protects the corresponding RDFO’s payload
block from unauthorized modification. The unique identifier for each of the previously
relayed packets is stored separately from the relay descriptor data in the PkID field(s). The
reason for this is because Sxi must be able to translate the unique identifier to the new unique
identifiers of the RDFO messages when they are forwarded to their final destination. The
hash of the concatenation of the fields # Entries and the relay descriptor data section is
encrypted with DSKS', the resulting signature is then stored in the p_dsig field. The unique
identifier block cannot be protected since it must be adjusted by the relay station.
The descriptor information is arranged in chronological order of the RDFO frames
which were transmitted ahead of the RFI frame. For this reason, reliable synchronous trans
port is crucial for the proper operation of the protocol extension. Incoming relay data mes
sages that arrive from Axand S. are stored in separate queues by Sxi. The source endpoint is
notified that the message was successfully received by the relay station. This ensures that
the exchange of messages remains synchronous.
If the message received is an RDF1 message, it is immediately queued to the proper
transmission queue. If the originator of the message is S., the message is queued for trans
mission to A . On the other hand, if the originator is Ax. Sxi examines the SID field. If the
SID field addresses a valid S. station, the RDF1 is then queued for transmission to the
proper destination S.. Otherwise, the message is discarded.

1
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If the message received is an RDFO message, it is queued into the proper Incoming
Relay Queue. Because the MAC frame relay protocol extension cannot assume that the
header block does not have an unused address field where the final destination of the RDFO
message may be stored, the existence of the unique identifier is crucial for the protocol
extension to work.
Messages from different S.’s are queued separately for efficient organization. Also,
since all of these isolated stations have a relayed network session established with the only
access point in the wLAN, all incoming relay data messages from Axare stored in a separate
queue. This is needed because the RDFO frame header is unable to carry distinguishing
information to provide Sxi clues as to which isolated station is the intended destination.
Therefore, all RDFO messages are stored in a single Incoming Relay Queue for messages
arriving from Ax.
When an RFI message arrives, Sx. examines the originator. If the RFI message
arrived from S., the messages in the Incoming Relay Queue for messages that arrived from
S. is placed in the transmission queue for transport to Ax. Sxi takes note of the new unique
identifier (the sequence number for the packet to be transferred to the end station) so that
when it comes time to transmit the RFI message, it can replace the old unique identifier with
the new unique identifier. This allows the receiving end station to properly correlate the
relay descriptor data with the RDFO messages it received. Once the RFI’s PkID fields are
updated, the RFI message is placed in the transmission queue targeted for Ax.
On the other hand, if the RFI arrives from Ax, it must search the Incoming Relay
Queue for all messages that originated from the access point for all of the RDFO messages
whose unique identifier match the PkID entries of the RFI message. The SID field is used
to determine which isolated station should receive the sequence of RDFO messages. If the
station cannot be located, all of the RDFO messages identified in the RFI message, and the
RFI message itself, are discarded. If the session entry is located, the RDFO messages are
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placed in the transmission queue in the order they were received from Ax, taking note of
each unique identifier frame transmitted to S.. These unique identifiers replace the appro
priate PkID values in the RFI message before it is transported to S..
The actions taken by the end stations, Ax and S(, arc dependent on the type of mes
sage received. If the message is an RDF1 message, the relay descriptor data is extracted
from the frame’s payload. The hash of the concatenation of RDF1 's payload, SJD, and Src/
Dest are compared with the hash extracted from the decryption of dsig using DSKS. If the
signature challenge fails, the message is discarded. If the message is proven to be authentic,
the message is accepted.
If the message is an RDFO message, it is stored in the Incoming Relay Queue since
the RDFO message relies on the RFI message to carry relay descriptor data. Once the RFI
message is received, the end station verifies the authenticity of the message by comparing
the hash of the # Entries and the relay descriptor data fields with the hash obtained from
decrypting p_dsig with DSKS. If the challenge fails, the message is discarded. If the mes
sage is proven to be authentic, then the RFI message is considered valid, and the RDFO
messages received ahead of the RFI message may be addressed.
Each RDFO message is removed from the queue in the order they arrived (maintain
ing the FIFO stream of data between the two end points.) As each RDFO message is ex
tracted from the queue, its corresponding relay descriptor data is extracted from the RFI
message’s payload. The authenticity of each individual RDFO message is challenged. A
hash of the RDFO’s payload is generated, and it is compared with the hash extracted from
dsig after it had been decrypted with DSKS. If the hashes match, then the message is con
sidered authentic and may be accepted. Otherwise the message should be discarded.
After an RDFO or an RDF1 message has been authenticated, the receiving station
(Axor S.) may process it. If the processing station is S., the payload is passed up to the upper
layers, and is reported to have originated from the address stated in the Src/Dest field.
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If the receiving station is Ax, its processing depends on the true destination of the
data frame.
1)

If the Src/Dest field references a station which is not a member of the wLAN

managed by Ax, then the message is forwarded onto the distribution system which connects
the access point to a wired network. The destination address of the message is set to the
value stored in Src/Dest. If the original MAC protocol uses the wLAN station’s address as
the originator of the message to be transmitted on the distribution system, then the address
of S. is stored in the message’s originator address field.
2)

If the Src/Dest field in the message’s corresponding relay descriptor data

references another member of the wLAN managed by Ax, then Ar transmits the data frame
under (through normal or relayed MAC protocols) the name of S., forging it if necessary. If
the original wLAN architecture supports the access point performing role of receiving and
retransmitting frames between clients to solve the hidden node problem [Di96,Ge99], such
as IEEE 802.11, then the normal MAC protocols are used to transmit the message to its final
destination.
When other members of the wLAN wish to transmit a message to Sr Axmust be able
to intercept the message and forward it to S. through the relaying protocol. Because of this,
Sj must ignore non-relay messages addressed to it to avoid receiving messages twice.
Phase 3: Relayed Network Session Termination
The termination of the relayed network session is the simplest phase of the Wireless
MAC Frame Relay Protocol Extension. There are three possible scenarios when this phase
occurs.
1)

The isolated station (S.) initiates the termination of its relayed network ses

sion. This occurs if S. discovers an access point with which it may engage in normal, nonrelayed network protocols, or if the user of the isolated station terminates network access
when the system is shut down.
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2)

The relay station (Sxi) initiates the termination of its role in the relayed net

work session. This occurs if Sxi decides to reduce its system load, to shut down, or reasso
ciate with a different wLAN.
3)

The access point (Ax) initiates the termination of the relayed network ses

sion. Events likely to trigger this include hardware resets and preventive measures to re
duce wLAN load from critical levels.
If Si terminates the relayed network session, it generates a TRS message, and trans
mits it to S .. After Sxj acknowledges the reception of the message, Si clears itself of all data
associated with the relayed network session. Sxi then extracts the SID field from the TRS
message, and forwards the message on to Ax. After Ax acknowledges receiving the TRS
message, Sxi can safely eliminate all traces of its responsibilities in the relayed network
session for S.. After acknowledging the reception of the TRS message, Ax purges all data
associated with the relayed network session after retrieving the identity of the station from
the SID field, effectively terminating the protocol extension.
If Axterminates the relayed network session, it generates a TRS message, and trans
mits it to Sxi. After Sxi acknowledges the reception of the message, Axmay clear itself of all
data associated with the relayed network session. Sy. then e -.tracts the SID field from the
TRS message, and forwards the message on to S.. After S. acknowledges receiving the TRS
message, S . can safely eliminate all traces of its responsibilities in the relayed network
session for S.. After acknowledging the reception of the TRS message, and verifying that
the SID field does refer to S., S. erases all data associated with the relayed network session,
effectively terminating the protocol extension. This process repeats itself for each relayed
network session that A decides to terminate.
X

Finally, if S ; terminates the relayed network session, it generates two TRS mes
sages for each isolated station that it is serving. Both TRS messages for each S. have the
address of S. in the message's S.ID field. One message is transmitted to Ax, the other to S..
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Once both Axand S. acknowledge the message, Sxi clears itself of that relay session. This is
repeated for each relayed network session that Sxi may wish to terminate. Ax extracts the
SID field from the TRS message, and e'iminates the active relay session it addresses. S.
validates that the S.ID matches the address of the station; if it does, the station terminates the
relayed network session, clearing all state information.
A Survey of Authentication Protocols and Cryptography used in the Protocol Extension
As stated before, the protocol extension is highly dependent on cryptographic and
digital signature technology in order to preserve the authenticity of messages exchanged
between Ax and Sr Encrypting the secrets passed in the RRCS and the RsRCS message is
vital to prevent unauthorized access to a wLAN through the protocol extension. The use of
digital signatures prevents other stations from modifying the contents of the messages ex
changed between the end stations.
Encryption in the protocol extension is realized through the use of a public key
algorithm. The user of public key cryptography simplifies the distribution of keys inside a
relayed network environment. Because it is computationally hard to derive the private key
out of the public key, only one set of public and private keys is required to protect any
relayed network connection establishment messages transmitted to the access point. This is
useful because the access point is a central authority which all stations must address. On
the other hand, in order to ensure the security of messages transmitted to the isolated sta
tions, each isolated station must have a different set of private and public keys from one
another, since there could be many isolated stations associated to the wLAN. Examples of
good public-key encryption algorithms which fall under this classification include RSA,
ElGamal, and Rabin. [Sc96]
Both symmetric and public-key algorithms are used for the generation and authenti
cation of digital signatures in the protocol '" tension. The public-key digital signature keys
are used during the connection setup phase, and are reused for each connection setup at
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tempt. A digital signature key for a symmetric algorithm is used only during the Relayed
Data Transport phase, and is different between each relayed network session. Using a sym
metric algorithm over a public-key algorithm for exchanging digital signature data has sev
eral advantages:
• It reduces the number of keys involved in generating a digital signature to one key,
which is used for generating and validating a digital signature. If a public-key algorithm
was used, the number of keys that would have to be maintained between the isolated station
and the access point could increase to as many as four (two public, and two private keys.)
This key must be kept secret between the access point and the isolated station.
• Symmetric algorithms are at least 1,000 times faster than public-key algorithms.
[Sc96]
• By reducing the number of times that the public-key algorithm is used to the au
thentication message exchange (which is a total of four messages for any one relayed net
work session, in comparison to the thousands or millions of data packets which may be
exchanged after the session has been established), the difficulty for cryptoanalysts to derive
these keys through a chosen-plaintext attack becomes much harder. [Sc96]
« The variance of the digital signature key between relayed network sessions denies
cryptoanalysts the ability to use plaintexts of previous sessions for chosen-plaintext attacks.
Even if an attacker is successful in deriving the digital signature key, it will not be valid in
future relayed network sessions. [Sc96]
Any public-key algorithm may also be used for generating a digital signature. The
private key is used to encrypt the data to be signed, which produces the signature. The
public key is used to decrypt the signature. This works because it is computationally hard to
derive a private key out of the public key, even if their roles have been reversed. Similarly,
any symmetric algorithm may be used since only the end stations will have access to the

key; a good example for this purpose is DES. There also exists other digital signature
algorithms, such as DSA, GOST, and ESIGN. [Sc96]
In the interest of reducing the computation time of the digital signature algorithm
and the space requirements for the resulting signature for a particular unit of data, a one
way hash function is implemented. Examples of one-way hash functions include Snefru,
MD4. MD5, and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). Hashing the data to be signed reduces the
size from the data’s original length to the size of the hash. As stated by Schneier, “Speed
increases drastically and, since the chances of two different documents having the same
160-bit hash are only one in 2160, anyone can safely equate a signature of the hash with a
signature of the document.” [Sc96]
In the definition of the RRCS message, a reference was made to a cryptographic
attack called the “Man in the Middle Attack”. This is an active cryptographic attack in
which an entity between two communicating parties (such as Sxi, which is between Si and
Ax, but it could be any other station which is associated to the wLAN) intercepts and alters
messages, pretending to each end point to be the other. [Sc96] As long as the cryptographic
keys shared between S. and Axhave not been compromised, an attacker can only capture the
relayed frames exchanged between S. and A,.
If the relayed connection session establishment process did not randomize its
ciphertext, an outside entity could attack the protocol extension by using previously cap
tured messages. An attacker could attempt a denial of service attack against an access point
by using captured connection setup messages of previous relayed network sessions from
many different isolated stations. If successful, this will result in a situation where legitimate
isolated stations would be denied access to the network through the protocol extension. An
existing relayed network session could be unexpectedly reset at the access point by trans
mitting to it the same connection establishment messages. The protocol extension would
break down because the isolated station would be ignorant of this reset. Its’ session digital
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signature key would be invalidated after the access point had generated a new key for the
“new session”. Conversely, an attacker could fool an isolated station into believing that it
has successfully established a relayed network session when, in fact, the connection setup
request was denied, or never even received, by the access point. This would result in the
isolated station transmitting messages it expects to be relayed, terminating only after net
work time-outs becomes indicative of a communications failure.
By randomizing the ciphertext portions of the connection setup messages, the bit
patterns of each message varies between each relayed network session. This variation re
duces the likelihood of a captured relayed network connection establishment messages be
ing used in the future as an attack. This is because the encoded random number pairs are
unlikely to be identical given a sufficiently large range of values for each number. Any
messages which carry unexpected random numbers are simply discarded.

CHAPTER III
IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLE: IEEE 802.11

Although the MAC Frame Relaying Protocol Extension defined in this thesis is
intended to be generalized enough such that it may be applied to nonspecific wLAN archi
tectures, the wLAN architecture defined by IEEE 802.11 influenced the protocol extension’s
structure and basic requirements. Therefore, because the networking model defined by
IEEE 802.11 easily meets the protocol extension’s basic requirements, the availability of
simulation models based on this standard, and the rapidly growing deployment of IEEE
802.11-based technology, a modified version of IEEE 802.11 which supports relayed net
work sessions was developed and is explored in this chapter.
Introduction to IEEE 802.13
The IEEE 802.11 standard is one of the newest additions to the family of interna
tionally recognized IEEE 802 standards. It was proposed by Victor Hayes in May 1991, and
was finally completed in June 1997. The benefit of IEEE 802.11 in comparison to other
proprietary wLAN protocols is the standardization of wLAN technology. This standardiza
tion promotes vendor interoperability, decreases development time and costs, and ensures a
stable migration path for future wLAN technology. The official title of IEEE 802.11 stan
dard is “IEEE Standard for Wireless LAN Medium Access (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
Specifications”. [Ge99]
Of the seven layers defined by the OSI Reference Model, the 802.11 standard de
fines the functionality of both the MAC (which is one half of the Data Link Layer) and
Physical layers. This is consistent with other physical layer standards which are members
39
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of the IEEE 802 family (such as Ethernet and token ring). The task of these layers is to
deliver MSDUs (MAC Service Data Units) between LLCs. The Logical Link Control (LLC),
the upper half of the Data Link Layer, defined by IEEE 802.2 “specifies the mechanisms for
addressing stations across the medium and for controlling the exchange of data between
two stations". This separation of functionality between layers allows the layers oriented to
•pecific physical characteristics to be exchanged without requiring modifications to the
LLC and the above layers. Therefore, the same LLC defined by 802.2 may be used by
IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.5, and IEEE 802.11. [Ge99]
IEEE 802.11 defines two topologies. One topology is an environment where wire
less stations communicate directly to one another without the influence of a centralized
network controller (an ad hoc network) which is called an Independent Basic Service Set
(IBSS) network. The other topology is the Extended Service Set (ESS), which uses access
points to link wLANs to a distribution system, such as an Ethernet network. [Ge99] The
latter topology is the topology model that benefits from the MAC Frame Relaying Protocol
Extension.
Access to the wireless media is controlled by two coordination functions. The Dis
tributed Coordination Function (DCF) is required for any implementation of TEEE 802.11.
Under the DCF. stations use a Carrier-Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/
CA) protocol before transmitting a packet. The other coordination function, the Point Co
ordination Function (PCF) is an optional protocol which uses a centralized coordinator
(usually the access point) to provide contention-free packet exchange. Stations which are
members of the wireless LAN transmit only when given permission by the central coordi
nator. [Ge99]
Structure of the IEEE 802.11 MAC Frame
Like the other official network standards that, are members of the IEEE 802 family,
such as Ethernet (802.3) and Token-Ring (802.5), 802.11 defines an overall MAC frame
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format. This structure is shared by all of the frame types (management, control, and data)
defined in the standard. A graphical display of the MAC data frame format presented by
[Ge99] is provided in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: IEEE 802.11 MAC frame format [Ge99, p. 142]
The Frame Control field contains descriptor information about the frame, the details
of which is documented after exploring the MAC frame format. The Duration/ID Field
contains a duration value, the meaning of which is dependent on the type of MAC frame. In
most frames, it carries information that identifies the duration of the next frame to be trans
mitted. Other stations on the network monitor this Field, holding off their transmissions
based on the duration information. [Ge99]
The Address 1 through 4 Fields contain different types of addresses, depending on
the frame type. Typical addresses stored in these Fields include the address of the transmit
ting station, the destination station, and the access point. The length of each address in
IE E E

802.11 is 48 bits. The location of these addresses among the four address Fields vary

depending on the frame type. [Ge99]
The Sequence Control field (the leftmost four bits) contains both the fragment num
ber and the MSDU sequence number (the remaining 12 bits.) The Frame Body (referred to
as the Payload Block in Chapter 2) is a variable-length field which carries information that
pertains to the specific frame being sent. In the case of a Data frame, this is a unit of data
which was passed down from the upper layers. The last field, the Frame Check Sequence
(FCS) carries the result of a 32-bit frame check sequence using the Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC). This CRC is used to check all of the fields ahead of the FCS to detect any
errors in the packet that may have occurred during its transmission. [Ge99]
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The Frame Control field itself carries many subfields which carries additional con
trol and descriptor information. The arrangement of these subfields are shown in Figure 32.
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Figure 3-2: Frame Control format [Ge99]
The Protocol Version field defines the version of the IEEE 802.11 MAC frame used.
Currently, 0 is the only valid value, although that may change with future revisions of the
standard. The Type field defines what type of frame it is (Management, Control, or Data;
Resen’ed is not used under the normal MAC protocol). The Subtype field further classifies
the frame type, based on the frame classification defined in Type. The To DS field denotes
whether the packet should be routed to the distribution system (the infrastructure network
which the access point provides access to for all member stations of the wLAN). Con
versely, the From DS field denotes if the packet came from the distribution system. [Ge99]
The IEEE 802.11 standard supports the fragmentation of MSDUs. By breaking up
an MSDU into smaller pieces, the probability of a successful transmission increases due to
the smaller frame size. The 802.11 standard defines a parameter, aFragmentationThreshold
such that when the size of an MSDU exceeds this parameter, it is broken up into smaller
fragments. Each fragment is transmitted in individual data frames, each requiring separate
acknowledgments. The More Frag field denotes if the current MSDU has any further frag
ments following the current frame. If it is set to 0, then this frame contains the final frag
ment. Previous fragments, if any, may be combined together to form the complete MSDU.
A 1 indicates that this frame is either the first or a middle fragment, and that more are on the
way. [Ge99]
The Retry field denotes if this frame is the retransmission of an earlier frame; a
frame is retransmitted after a period of time if the receiving station failed to respond with an
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acknowledgment. If the frame is a retransmission, the field is set to 1. Otherwise it is set to
0. The Power Management field indicates the power management mode which the sending
station will be set to after transmitting the frame. A value of 1 indicates sleep mode; a value
of 0 indicates that the station will continue to be active. The More Data field denotes that
the sending station has more frames to transmit to the receiving station after this frame; it is
primarily

for stations that arc in power-saving mode, alerting the receiving station to be

ready for more frames to come (such as remaining fragments for the current MSDU if it has
been fragmented.) The WEP field notifies the receiving station that the WEP algorithm has
processed the frame’s payload. The value is 1 if the payload has been encrypted, otherwise
the value is set to 0. The final field. Order, is set to tell the receiving station that frames must
be processed in order. [Ge99]
IEEE 802.11 Defined Frame Types
As stated earlier, IEEE 802.11 defines four separate frame types: the Management
frame type, the Control frame type, the Data frame type, and the Reserved frame type.
These separate types group related operations together.
Frames that fall under the Management class are responsible for the establishment
of initial communications between wireless stations and access points. Management ser
vices include Association, Authentication, Disassociation, and Deauthentication. Associa
tion is the process of mapping a station to the distribution system through an access point; a
station may associate with no more than one access point, but an access point may be asso
ciated with multiple stations. Association is needed in an architecture in which multiple
access points are connected to the distribution system. The mapping provides a path for
packets to properly reach the end station. Disassociation is the termination of the associa
tion service. Authentication is the process where a station positively identifies itself when
establishing a network connection; this prevents unauthorized stations from gaining access
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to the wireless network. Deauthentication is a notification that a station wishes to terminate
its current network session. [Ge99]
Control frames are a class of frames that provide functionality to assist in the deliv
ery of data frames. Frame types that fall under this classification include Acknowledgment
(ACK), Request to Send (RTS), and Clear to Send (CTS). The Acknowledgment frame is
used by a receiving station to signal the transmitting station that a frame was received suc
cessfully and without error. A station that fails to receive an acknowledgment after a short
period of time retransmits the frame that it assumes has been lost. The Request to Send and
Clear to Send frames are part of a mechanism built into IEEE 802.11 that allows a transmit
ting station to temporally gain a contention-free period of time to transmit a data frame to its
destination station. This is especially useful during periods of time when network utiliza
tion is nigh, or for dealing with the collisions resulting from traffic from stations which are
undetectable to the transmitting station (hidden nodes). [Ge99]
The frames belonging to the Data frame class is used for transporting data, such as
MSDUs, from source to destination. In an infrastructure in which an access point controls
the wLAN, the To DS, From DS, and Address fields in the data frames may vary, as follows:
[Ge99]
• In a peer -to-peer transport of a data frame, From DS and To DS are both 0. Address
1 contains the address of the destination station, Address 2 contains the address of the source
station, and Address 3 contains the address of the access point. [Ge99]
* If the data frame originated from the distribution system. From DS remains 0, but
To DS is set to 1. Address 1 continues to carry the address of the destination station, Address
2 contains the address of the access point, and Address 3 contains the address of the source
station. [Ge99]
° If a station wishes to send a data frame to a station beyond the wLAN (the destina
tion resides on the distribution system or beyond), To DS is set to 1, and From DS is set to 0.
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The value assigned to Address 1 is the address of the access point (the station in the wLAN
which has physical access to the distribution system). Address 2 is assigned the address of
the transmitting station, and Address 3 contains the address of the destination of the frame.
[Ge99]
The Reserved class of frames is composed of a range of bit field patterns which are
unused in a normal IEEE 802.11 client. In a normal, unmodified IEEE 802.11 network, any
frame which uses any of the reserved bits are ignored by the receiving station. This default
behavior allows wireless stations which are enabled with the protocol extension to function
among unmodified stations without throwing these stations into an error state. [Ge99]
Modifications to IEEE 802.11 to Support the Protocol Extension
As stated before, IEEE 802.11 supports all of the protocol extension’s requirements.
The standard supports unacknowledged frame broadcasts, and most management, control,
and all data frames are supplemented with acknowledgment frames to notify the sending
station that its frame was received successfully and are intact. The Frame Control field in
the MAC header has a sufficient number of unallocated bit patterns to support identifying
the new frame types as defined in the protocol extension. IEEE 802.11 allows asynchro
nous access to the wireless media, meaning that any station may transmit as long as no other
transmissions are taking place. [Ge99]
With the access point and the relay station, access to the media may be controlled by
the DCF or the PCF. With the latter, relayed packets are transmitted during the relay station’s
turn. Since the isolated station is likely out of communications range with the point coordi
nator, it usually will depend on the DCF for media access. Since DCF is a requirement for
all implementations of the IEEE 802.11 standard, this should not pose a problem.
All entities in a relaying-enabled IEEE 802.11 wLAN will require more memory for
proper system operation. The amount of additional memory required is dependent on the
type of station involved in the protocol. For a relay station, additional memory is required
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for records which contain state information about each active relay station it has taken part
in. In addition to these records, memory must also be allocated for the Incoming and Out
going Relay Queues.
The additional memory requirement for the isolated station includes not only the
state information which must be maintained for the setup and lifetime of a relayed network
session, but also the Outgoing Relay Queue, and the NAP List. In addition to the mandatory
contents of each entry in the NAP List (access point address, cryptographic keys, etc.), there
must be descriptor information about the wLAN managed by that specific access point.
This descriptor data includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the data rate, radio frequency,
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security information, hopping code and dwell time (for
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum-based wLANs), and Management Information Base
(MIB)-deflned attributes such as aFragmentationThreshold. [Ge99]
The access point’s additional memory requirements must be large enough to main
tain state information for pending and active relayed network sessions for each isolated
station, as well as the Outgoing Relay Queue, and the Relayed Frame Clients List. There is
no need for additional descriptor information about the wLAN, since its characteristics are
dictated by the access point.
Since the isolated station is not able to directly communicate with the access point,
the station must rely on IEEE 802.11 ’s IBSS functionality to communicate with nearby
stations. The authentication protocol defined by IEEE 802.11 are not used in the establish
ment of a relayed network session since the protocol extension performs a significant amount
of authentication challenges on its own. Likewise, IEEE 802.1 l ’s association process is
unnecessary in a relayed network session. The isolated station is automatically mapped to
the access point once the connection setup phase has been completed. Deauthentication
and disassociation of a relayed network session is performed through the protocol extension
as well, never through IEEE 802.11 ’s deauthentication and disassociation services.
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The RF[ broadcast, and the messages exchanged between the isolated station and
the relay station always have the To DS and From DS Fields set to 0, since there is no
distribution system involved in the message transfers between these two stations. Relay
messages exchanged between the access point and the relay station also have the To DS and
From DS fields set to 0. This is because the relay message is generated by the protocol
extension and is not the actual frame which is transported to or from the distribution system
(that frame is encoded and recovered from the relayed data stream.)
Relay messages are transported through IEEE 802.11 ’s data frame structure (see
Figure 3-1.) This is because it is more flexible than the control or management frame
formats. Since relay messages can be as large as standard data frames, the RTS/CTS opera
tion may be invoked to reserve the wLAN for a time sufficient to transmit the frame without
collision.
Allocation of Unused Frame Type Bit Patterns
Since the existing standard had sufficient free bit-sequences to represent all of the
message types defined by the relayed frame protocol extension (meeting the third require
ment), individual message types were assigned individual bit patterns. If an existing wLAN
architecture has an insufficient number of unused bit sequences to represent all of the relay
message types, it may be possible, depending on the flexibility of the original MAC proto
col, to combine multiple functions under a few message types. An ID type could be stored
in the payload section; however, this approach will increase the complexity of the relayed
frame protocol extension implementation.
With the exception of the data transport messages RDFO and RDF1, all relay-type
messages have been assigned subfield bit patterns underneath the Reserved Frame type.
The data transport messages have been assigned unused subfield bit patterns under the Data
Frame type. Refer to Table 3-1 for the complete listing of the associated relay message
types with the available frame type field patterns.

48

Table 3-1: Frame type bit field patterns with associated relay message types
Frame Type

Subfield (bits 7,6,5,4)

Relayed M essage Type

R eserved Type
(bit 3, bit 2) - 11

0000

RFS

0001

RRFS

0010

ARS

0011

ARS_ACK

0100

RRCS

0101

RCD

0110

RsRCS

0111

ARCS

1000

ARCS_ACK

1001

RFI

1010

TRS

1000

RDF1

1001

RDFO

D a ta ty p e
(bit 3, bit 2) = 10

CHAPTER IV
IEEE 802.11 WITH FRAME RELAYED PROTOCOL EXTENSION SIMULATION

Introduction to OPNET
The simulation software, Optimum Network Performance (OPNET) [OpOl], was
the simulation tool selected to prove that the frame relaying protocol extension works, and
to measure its performance. Developed by OPNET Technologies, this powerful simulation
tool enables researchers to explore the performance of various network configurations, and
to experiment with modifying existing standards, through its large library of models. One
of the models in its library is a simple implementation of the IEEE 802.11 standard, which
supports both IBSS and ESS wLANs. It was this model that was modified to support the
frame relayed protocol extension.
In OPNET, a network simulation is composed of models organized in a hierarchical
structure which promotes modularity and object/code reuse. A project’s network model, in
OPNET, is composed of one or more Node modules. Node modules are the servers, switches,
routers, physical inter-node link connections (i.e., a 100 Mbps ethemet link), workstations,
application profiles, and much more. Figure 4-1 presents the node structures for an access
point and a wireless station in OPNET’s implementation of IEEE 802.11.
Each Node module is composed of one or more process models. Process models are
objects which define low-level functionality, behavior, and data structures. Examples of
process models include the implementation of OPNET’s model of IEEE 802.11 ’s MAC
layer and the higher layers in the protocol stack (i.e., TCP and Applications). Process mod
els are interconnected with other process models inside of a node, creating an inter-process
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Figure 4-1: OPNET node model diagrams, (a) Access Point node model, (b) Wireless
Station node model.
communication system for the exchanging of data between process model entities. The
process model for wlan_mac, OPNET's implementation of IEEE 802.11, is presented in
Figure 4-2.
These Process models are composed of State Variables, Temporary Variables, asso
ciated code blocks, Header blocks, and atomic State objects which are arranged in a Finite
State Machine (FSM). Inside of these State objects is proto-C code which the simulation
executes at run-time.
OPNET supports a massive range of statistics which may be gathered during the
execution of the simulation. A small sample of the types of statistics which can be gathered
include throughput, end-to-end delay, retransmissions, backoff slots, transmission queue
lengths, and more. For more information about OPNET’s implementation of IEEE 802.11
in its wlan_mac module, refer to [OpOO].
Model Modifications to Support the Frame Relayed Protocol Extension
The basic finite state machine model of OPNET’s implementation of IEEE 802.11,
wlan_mac, was largely left unchanged, with the exception to the code contents of the FSM
states BSS_INIT and IDLE. Most of the modifications to the existing model are found in
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Figure 4-2: Process model for the OPNET wlan_mac IEEE 802.11 model.
the State and Temporary Variable blocks, the Header Block, and the Function Block. There
were several new statistics defined that record the activity (primarily throughput) of the
protocol extension functionality, and several input variables that denote whether or not the
protocol extension should be enabled, which station that an isolated station would choose
for its relay station (in the simulation, the PJFS message is not broadcasted), and maximum
number of pending RDFO messages before forcing an RFI message.
The new entries inside of the State Variables primarily provide storage for model
configuration, pointers to new data structures which carry new information specific to the
protocol extension, and statistic handles.
Several new data structures were defined inside of the Header Block. They serve the
purpose of storing data which must be maintained by the access point, by the relay station,
and by the isolated station, including the Incoming and Outgoing Relay Queues. The new
relay message types (RFS, etc.), and identifiers that denote the status of what point in the
relayed network session setup phase a station is currently in, were also defined in this sec
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tion of the model’s code. The READY_TO_TRANSMIT macro was modified to support
the self-generated interrupt which schedules the generation of relayed network session con
nection messages.
The new code which allows the model to support the protocol extension is within
the Function Block. The changes in this section of the code can be summarized as follows:
• In the State Variable and Statistic Handle initialization function (wlan_mac_svjnit),
new code was inserted to support the initialization of the new State variables with either
initial zero values, or values assigned from the configuration of the node module. Handles
for new statistics are allocated and stored in the Process module’s State Variables.
• In the function wlan_higher_lciyer_dala__arrival, which receives packets arriving
from the upper network layers, new code had to be inserted to determine if the station is
dependent on the frame relaying protocol extension to transport the packet to its final desti
nation. The result of that decision selects the queueing function with which the incoming
packet is processed. Queuing functions include the original wlan_hlpk_enqueue function
for when relaying is not required or for packets requiring relaying for successful transport,
the jag_ax_relayjilph_enqueue__data/jag_si_relay_hlph_enqueue_data functions. The task
of the enqueue functions is to place the arriving packets into the transmission queue after
performing any necessary preprocessing.
• The functions responsible for frame transmission are wlan_Jmme_tmnsmit and
wlan_prepare_frame_to_send. These functions were modified to recognize the new mes
sage types defined by the protocol extension, and to encode them in IEEE 802.11’s data
frame format. The modifications to the settings of the To DS and From DS fields referred to
in Chapter 3 were performed here. Relay message frames support the model’s built-in RTS/
CTS flow control mechanism.
0Frame relay protocol extension communication setup messages are scheduled by a
self-generated interrupt, identified by JAG_RELAY_INTERRUPT. The expiration of the
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Force RFI Timer timer generates another interrupt, JAG_RFI_INTERRUPT. The function
wlan_interrupts_process, the wireless LAN model’s interrupt processing function, was ex
tended to support these new interrupts. In the case of a JAGJRELAY_INTERRUPT. the
function jag_relay_hlpk_enqueue is called if the station is the isolated station or the relay
station. If the station is an access point, the function jag_ax_relay_hlph_enqueue. These
functions arc responsible for the generation and queuing of the connection setup messages.
In the event that a JA G _RFI_IN TERRU PT w'as invoked, either the function
jag_ax_rfi_hlph_enqueue ovjagjsi_rfi_hlph_enqueue is called, depending on what type of
station (access point or isolated station) received the interrupt.
* The function that processes packets that arrive from the physical layer,
wlan_physical_layer_data_arrival, was modified to support the processing of all of the
relay message types defined by the protocol extension. To simplify the code structure of the
function, the processing for each new message type was relocated to an array of additional
functions. The successful reception of connection setup messages updates the station’s
connection setup status flags. The reception of relayed data frames and relay descriptors
are processed depending on the station type. If the station is an end station, the incoming
data messages are queued until an RFI message is received. Once an RFI message is re
ceived, all of the queued messages are then passed up to the upper layers. If the station is a
relay station, the messages are queued until an RFI message is received, after which the
queued messages and the RFI are forwarded to the final end station.
• Because this implementation of the frame relayed protocol extension requires that
the flow of relayed data messages and RFI messages cannot be interrupted, the retry limit
imposed on MAC frames must be ignored for relay frames. This required a small modifica
tion in the wlan_Jrame_discard function to check if the frame currently being considered
for discard is a relay frame. If it is, then the frame is never discarded. Otherwise, the
original frame discard procedure is allowed to continue.
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The modifications to the BSS_INIT state occur in its entry code. In this state, the
station discovers the existence of the other stations which are part of the subnet.

If the

station is an access point, it examines the distance between itself and other individual sta
tions in the subnet. If the distance exceeds the radio range specified for the simulation, a
Relayed Frame Clients List entry is created for that station. If the station is not an access
point, and it detects that the distance between itself and the subnet’s access point is greater
than the established radio range, it marks itself as an isolated station and prepares itself to
begin the relayed communication session setup procedure. This occurs in the IDLE phase,
which follows the BSS_INIT phase. Finally, if the station is not an access point, and is
within the coverage area of the subnet’s access point, the station initializes a data structure
which prepares it for the possibility of becoming a relay station later in the execution of the
simulation.
In the IDLE state, the enter code was modified to support much of the connection
setup process. When the station enters the IDLE state, it examines the status of its relayed
connection setup. If the system is in a state where it should prepare a relay connection
message, it schedules a JAG_RELAY_INTERRUPT, and updates its status to denote that an
interrupt for the requested message type has been requested. This new status value is read
by wlan_interrupts_process to determine what kind of message to generate.
Simulation Configuration
The layout of the simulation was carefully designed to examine the effects of the
protocol extension when it is engaged. The time span of each simulation, whether or not it
invokes the protocol extension, is one hour. This is a sufficient period of time for network
activity to level out after every wireless station has had the opportunity to establish its
communication session with the servers present in the model.
A File Transfer Protocol (FTP) application was chosen to drive the network traffic in
the simulation. FTP traffic is favorable because data transfers are serialized (as opposed to
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parallel data transfers, which may occur with web traffic), and are therefore less bursty. By
minimizing the burstiness of each station’s network activity, the negative effects of the frame
relaying protocol extension on throughput and delay should be more apparent when exam
ining the simulation results.

Figure 4-3: Layout diagram of the Ethernet distribution system and FTP Servers.
There are two FTP servers involved in the simulation, depicted in Figure 4-3 as a
pair of tower computer systems. Both are connected via 100 megabit Ethernet links to a
switch which is labeled Ethernet Switch. The server denoted as Si FTP Server provides
exclusive FTP services to the Isolated Station. All of the other wireless stations choose the
server FTP Server for their respective file transfers. This separation of Si’s FTP traffic from
that of the other stations allows a better insight into the amount of performance lost to Si,
and to the other collective stations, by the protocol extension. The size of files on the Si
FTP Server were uniformly distributed between one and five megabytes. For the FTP Server,
the file size were distributed uniformly between 500k and one megabyte; smaller file sizes
were chosen because the FTP Server would be serving multiple clients concurrently. Each
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server had a single processor, and was able to process 2 megabytes of data per second.
Every FTP request had a server overhead of IE-06 seconds.
The third 100 megabit link connects the Ethernet Switch to the access point, called
the WLAN NAP, which is located inside the Campus Network subnet. In Figure 4-3, this
link is depicted as the link between Ethernet Switch and Campus Network. WLAN NAP
controls the wLAN inside of this subnet. The Ethernet network is significantly faster than
the IEEE 802.11 network. To eliminate throughput constraints and to minimize delay nec
essary to estimate the real performance of the wLAN. The Application Config object de
fines the application behavior which generates the simulation’s network traffic. The object
denoted as Profile Config governs which FTP server each of the wireless stations attempt to
establish an FTP session with.
In the interest of simplifying the simulation design and layout, all of the wLAN
stations and the access point were placed into the Campus Network s.Aret. Inside of this
subnet are five wireless stations, all of which are presented in Figure 4-4. WLAN Node 1 is
located on the leftmost edge of the wLAN, and is beyond the radio range of all of the frame
relaying protocol extension participants except the access point. Since the only relay mes
sage traffic it will receive originates from the access point, it should be the station least
affected by the additional network traffic incurred by the protocol extension.
WLAN Node 2 is located within the communication range of both the access point
and the relay station, but is still out of the communication range of the isolated station.
Therefore, it should receive the relay message traffic exchanged between the access point
and the relay station, and the transmissions from the relay station to the isolated station (but
not messages originating from the isolated station.) Because of this, WLAN Node 2 should
be more affected by the relayed network session than WLAN Node 1. The placement of
WLAN Node 3 is such that it receives all of the relayed message traffic that WLAN Node 2
receives, in addition to the traffic originating from the isolated station. Therefore, it should
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be the station that is most affected by the use of the frame relaying protocol extension that is
not involved in the relayed network session.
The wireless station, called the WLAN Node 4, is the designated relay station in the
simulation model. Although the protocol extension as defined in Chapter 2 states that the
RFS message is broadcasted for all potential relay stations to receive, the simulation was
designed to unicast the RFS message to a predetermined set station. This ensures that the
same relay station is selected among multiple iterations of the simulation. The effect of the
protocol extension should be the greatest among the non-isolated stations, since it is respon
sible for relaying frames between the access point and the isolated station in addition to its
own network access demands.
The final object, called the Isolated Station, is the wireless station which may or
may not be able to communicate with WLAN NAP, depending on the configuration of the
maximum radio range in the simulation. If it is unable to directly communicate with the
access point, it then attempts a relayed network session with WLAN NAP through WLAN
Node 4. It is the only station which interacts with the Si FTP Server; all of the other stations
communicate with FTP Server.
Every station has its wLAN physical characteristics set to the following specifica
tions:
• The wLAN’s data rate is 5.5 megabits per second.
• The Physical Layer is set to use Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum.
• Both RTS/CTS and Fragmentation are disabled.
• Fragmentation Threshold is set to 0 bytes (no fragmentation.)
• Only WLAN NAP is configured for access point functionality.
' Radio range is either 100 meters or 300 meters. The protocol extension is neces
sary only when the radio range is set to 100 meters. The circles drawn in Figure 4-4 depict
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Figure 4-4: Layout diagram of the Campus Network Wireless LAN
the 100 meter radio range of WLAN NAP, WLAN Node 4. and the Isolated Station, respec
tively.
• Assume negligible propagation delays.
• Each station had a statically assigned MAC Address. Table 4-1 provides a list of
the values assigned to each station.
The WLAN NAP, WLAN NODE 4, and Isolated Station objects required additional
configuration, specifically in the Wireless MAC Relaying Parameters subsection, in order
to use the frame relaying protocol extension:
• All three of these stations must have the field MAC Frame Relaying set to enabled,
otherwise the protocol extension will remain deactivated even in situations where it is the
only option for a station to establish a network connection with the access point.
• On the Isolated Station, the Maximum Relayed Frames Before Forcing RFI is set
to five. This limits the number of relay descriptors a RFI message may carry. Once five relay
data messages have been transmitted, a RFI message is automatically generated and trans
mitted immediately afterwards.
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Table 4-1: MAC addresses of wireless LAN stations.
S ta tio n
W LAN NAP

M A C A d d r ess
65

WLAN NODE 1

1

WLAN NODE 2

2

WLAN NODE 3

3

W LAN N O D E 4

4

I s o la te d S ta tio n

8

• The Target Sxi Node for the Isolated Station is set to 4, the MAC Address of
WLAN NODE 4. WLAN NODE 4 will serve as the relay station in simulations requiring
the use of the protocol extension. The current implementation of the protocol extension in
OPNET does not support the broadcasting of RFS messages.
Ten simulations were executed under this simulation configuration. The first five
were configured with a radio range of 300 meters, and each had a unique seed value initial
izing the simulation. The remaining five simulations were configured to match the first five
simulations’ seed values, and the radio range was collapsed to 100 meters. This would
force the Isolated Station to require the protocol extension in order to maintain network
connectivity. The results of these simulations are discussed in Chapter 5.
In these ten simulations, it is likely that relayed data packets would collide with
packets originating from the other stations associated with the wLAN. This would result in
retransmissions and therefore a reduction in throughput and an increase in delay. To exam
ine the performance of the protocol extension in an environment less prone to packet re
transmissions, two of the simulations (one and six, to examine both relayed and non-relayed
scenarios) were re-executed. In both of these two simulations, IEEE 802.1 l ’s RTS/CTS
mechanism was enabled and invoked with any data packet with a payload over 255 octets.
The results of this scenario are examined in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

The successful completion of the battery of simulations proves that the Frame Re
laying Protocol Extension successfully increased the coverage area of an IEEE 802.11based wireless LAN. This ensured that an isolated station that is within radio range of one
of the wLAN’s member stations can still access the network through a relayed network
session. This is evident in the simulations when the radio range was collapsed from 300 to
100 meters, as the Isolated Station is still able to establish contact and exchange data with
the Si FTP Server through the use of the protocol extension.
It was expected that the use of the protocol extension would decrease overall net
work throughput, and that the isolated station would likewise suffer a decrease in through
put and an increase in end-to-end delay. Although the wireless LAN as a whole entity
experienced a moderate loss of throughput, the throughput and delay penalties incurred on
the isolated station was much more than expected.
The results of the simulation are examined in the following order:
1) Overall Network Throughput Performance. In this section, the aggregate through
put for ever}' station that is part of the wLAN is examined. By analyzing the global through
put, gains and losses for every station are pooled together so that the overall gain/loss may
be analyzed. The global relayed throughput represents the total throughput of data passed
along through the protocol extension at the endpoints of the relayed network session.
2) Effects of the Protocol Extension on Delay. This section focuses on the overall
delay experienced by all of the wireless stations. This permits analysis of the widespread
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effects that the protocol extension has on delay. The global delay for relayed packets is also
analyzed to study the delay experienced by relayed data.
3) Effects of the Protocol Extension on Si’s Traffic. This section concentrates on the
differences in the performances experienced by the isolated station when it must relay on
the frame relay protocol extension in order to establish a network session.
4) Effects of the Protocol Extension on the WLAN NAP. In this section, the effects
of the protocol extension on the access point are explored. This station is of particular
importance since all data exchanged between the wireless stations and their respective FTP
servers must pass through this station.
5) Effects of the Protocol Extension on the Relay Station (Node 4). This section
studies the effects of the protocol extension on a station that volunteered to serve as a relay
station.
6) Effects of the Protocol Extension on Nodes 1 through 3’s Traffic. In this section,
the effects of the protocol extension on uninvolved stations are explored. Each station,
differing from one another only in their proximity to the relay station and the isolated sta
tion, is analyzed to examine how the use of the protocol extension affects other stations.
7) Effects of RTS/CTS on the Protocol Extension. Two separate simulations were
performed with the RTS/CTS option enabled to study the effects of the media-access con
tention management mechanism that is a part of IEEE 802.11. Without RTS/CTS, any lost
packets due to collisions have to be retransmitted. This may be expensive in terms of net
work bandwidth when large frames have to be retransmitted multiple times, especially when
relayed packets have an unlimited number of retry attempts.
In this chapter, the simulation scenario types are presented in two separate classifi
cations: non-frame-relayed scenarios and frame-relayed scenarios. The first five simula
tions fall under the former classification. In these simulations, the coverage area of the
wLAN was 300 feet, which was sufficient to reach all of the wireless stations. For the latter
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classification, the coverage area was collapsed to 100 meters, to force the Isolated Station to
depend on the frame relay protocol extension in order to communicate with the wireless
network and the Si FTP Server. Therefore in the sixth through tenth simulations, the proto
col extension was invoked.
In the figures that follow, the statistics gathered from the first simulation were used
to plot the various results for the non-frame-relayed scenarios. The results between the first
through fifth simulations were very similar to one another, despite varying seed values.
Since a method to derive a graph from the average of several simulations was unavailable in
OPNET, the results of the first simulation run were chosen to illustrate the non-frame-relayed scenario. Likewise, the statistics gathered from the sixth simulation (whose seed
value is identical to the first simulation) were used to plot the various graph results for the
frame-relayed scenario. This is acceptable since the results between the sixth through the
tenth simulations, which required the use of the protocol extension, were similar to one
another.
Many of the graphs were generated with the Average filter. This operation smoothed
much of the burstyness out of the graph for ease of understanding. Graphs generated with
the Adder filter were not smoothed since OPNET does not support the application of mul
tiple filters in graph generation.
Although the graphs only display the results of simulations one and six, the sample
mean and standard deviation of the various statistics studied for all of the simulations are
provided. Cross-simulation sample means and standard deviations are generated from these
values to illustrate the overall performance of the wireless network and the protocol exten
sion.
Overall Network Throughput Performance
In OPNET, throughput is defined as the amount of data received by a station that is
passed to the upper layers of its network stack (including data which is to be routed onto a
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distribution system.) This allows the true performance of the network to be analyzed, as it
provides information about how the upper layers (such as applications) perceive the net
work performance. It does not include data arriving from duplicate packets, control mes
sages, relay message data which passes through the relay station, or data from frames which
are not targeted specifically for the receiver. Since it is the data stream passed up to the
higher layers, it is only measured in bits per second.
The overall (global) network throughput performance, taking into consideration all
of the participating wireless workstations, took a modest performance when a relayed net
work session between Isolated Station and WLAN NAP was established. Refer to Table 51 for the sample mean throughput for each simulation and the calculated cross-simulation
sample mean for the vvLANs that did not use the protocol extension and those that did.
Table 5-1: Global throughput for the wLAN in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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In the non-frame-relayed scenario, the average throughput in the wLAN was ap
proximately 3,966 kilobits per second (kbps). This dropped to an average of 3,531 kbps in
the frame-relayed scenario, a loss of approximately 12%. Figure 5-1(a) depicts a history of
global throughput between the two simulation runs.
In the frame-relayed scenario, very little relayed data contributed to the wLAN’s
global throughput. While the average throughput of the wLAN was approximately 3,531
kbps, only 43 kbps of that was contributed by relayed data traffic (about one percent.) The
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rest of the global throughput was generated by the network traffic from WLAN Nodes 1
through 4. The graph in Figure 5-1(b) shows the vast difference between the total wLAN
throughput and its relayed throughput component. The sample means and standard devia
tions for relayed throughput are given in Table 5-2.

Figure 5-1: wLAN average global throughput performance in bits/sec. (a) Comparison of
throughput with and without the use of the protocol extension, (b) Comparison of total
throughput and relayed throughput.
Table 5-2: Global relayed throughput in bits/sec for the frame-relay scenario.
1
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-
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.
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51.945
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Effects of the Protocol Extension on Delay
OPNET defines Delay as the amount of time, in seconds, that it takes for a data-link
level packet to reach its destination. Delay is affected by both the distance of propagation,
backoffs waiting for the wireless media tc become available, and retransmissions resulting
from packet collisions. For relayed messages, delay is measured as the amount of time it
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takes for a data packet to propagate from its station of origin to the relay station, and from
the relay station to its final destination. Relayed messages can expect significantly longer
delays than non-relayed messages, because:
♦ The data carried by relayed messages must be transmitted twice (once to the relay
station, and once more to the final destination). Therefore, a single message has to wait
twice for transmission opportunities, which is likely to result in a longer delay as a result of
increased probabilities for frame collisions.
• The busyness of the relay station may significantly slow down its ability to process
relayed messages. In this study, CPU load was not made a contributing factor to delay on
the part of the relay station.
• When an RDFO data message arrives at the relay station (the only type supported
by the current model implementation of the relayed frame protocol extension), it must wait
for an RFI frame to arrive before it is transmitted to its final destination. Messages that
arrive earlier therefore experience a longer delay than messages that arrive later. The larger
the values assigned to Force RFI Timer or Max Outgoing Relay Queue length, the longer
the potential delay.
* The “Backoff Penalty”, due to extreme delay resulting from the increasing backoff
timer with every failed retransmission attempt, and an unlimited number of retransmission
attempts for relay messages. Normally IEEE 802.11 discards packets which are retransmit
ted too many times to reduce delay, leaving the responsibility of handling the packet loss to
the end station’s upper network layers. Since the protocol extension requires that all RDFO
messages described in an RFI message to have been successfully received ahead of itself,
relayed packets cannot be discarded. Even though IEEE 802.11 limits the maximum backoff
period per retransmission attempt with a constant aCWmax, by not eventually discarding
the packet (which would reset the backoff timer), other non-relayed packets which are likely

fe
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to have much shorter backoff periods have an advantage in gaining access to the transmis
sion media.
For example, a relayed packet may experience several retransmissions during a pe
riod of intense network activity, quickly maximizing the backoff timer to aCWmax. After
the period of intense network traffic has subsided, the relayed frame may still wait unrea
sonably long periods of time before attempting to retransmit, while other packets have much
smaller backoff due to packet discards (and thus backoff timer resets.)
Table 5-3 presents the average delays for non-relayed packets observed in all of the
simulation runs. Three graphs displaying the delay observed in the non-frame-relayed and
frame-relayed scenarios are available in Figure 5-2. Figure 5-2(a) illustrates the delay expe
rienced by packets in the non-frame-relayed scenario, where delay was observed at an aver
age of 0.57 seconds per packet. Figure 5-2(b) presents the average delay experienced by
non-relayed packets in the frame-relayed scenario. In both simulations, delay increased
linearly with time. In contrast to the first simulation, however, the slope of the graph in the
second simulation is much more shallow, with delay averaging at 0.18 seconds per packet.
In Figure 5-2(c) and Table 5-4, the delays experienced by relayed messages in the
frame-relayed scenarios are displayed. As expected, the delay experienced by relayed mes
sages is significantly longer than those experienced by non-relayed message, averaging
5.62 seconds per packet.
Ethernet Link Throughput
In Figure 4-3, there are three Ethernet links which interconnect the devices in the
wired infrastructure: Campus LAN (the wLAN) to the Ethernet Switch, FTP Server to the
Ethernet Switch, and the Si FTP Server to the Ethernet Switch. Statistics on the traffic
passing across each link were monitored to gain a better understanding of the distribution of
network resources by separating the Isolated Station’s activity from the activities that be
long to the remaining wireless stations.
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Table 5-3: Global delay wLAN in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol extension,
(b) Invoking the protocol extension (does not include relayed packets.)

Simitation 1

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Semple Mean

Standard Deviation

Kconrfi

•ecotrfs

seconds

accond*

0.67

0.35

Sintjktiw i6

0.20

0.07

Simifatiw 2

0.57

0.25

Semit ticm 7

0.20

0.08

3
.....
.............
SsT»jbfk?n4 ,

0.54

0.26

SpnJatioti8

0.17

0.07

0.44

0.24

Sirruk&n 9

0.14

0.05

Ssnubtbn 5

0.63

0.33

SknAttbii JO

0.19

0.04

S taple M e to

0.18

0.06

b ttV B x n n

S tm ^ t M e tn

0.?'*

0.57

(a)

(b)

Table 5-4: Global relayed frame delay in seconds for wLAN when invoking the protocol
extension (considers only relayed packets.)
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Figure 5-2: Average packet delay in seconds, (a) Average delay per packet in a wLAN in the
non-frame-relayed scenario, (b) Average delay per packet in a wLAN in the frame-relayed
scenario, (c) Average delay per packet experienced by relayed messages in the framerelayed scenario.
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The performance loss experienced by the Isolated Station in the frame-relayed sce
nario is quite apparent in the graphs in Figures 5-3. 5-4. and 5-5.

Statistical averages

extracted from all of the simulations are available in Tables 5-5 and 5-6. Overall throughput
(combining data transported in both directions) between the end stations dropped from an
average of 595 kbps (86.5 paekets/sec) to 50 kbps (8.39 packets/sec), nearly twelve times
slower.
Data from the Isolated Station destined for the Si FTP Server were transported through
the link at the rate of 494 kbps (49.03 packets/sec) in the non-frame-relayed scenario, and at
a rate of 30 kbps (4.27 packets/sec) in the frame-relayed scenario. Conversely, data origi
nating from the Si FTP Server en route to the Isolated Station passed through the link at a
rate of 101 kbps (37.47 packets/sec) in the non-frame-relayed scenario, and at a rate of 20
kbps (4.12 packets/sec) in the frame-relayed scenario.
Table 5-5: Average throughput in bits/sec and packets/sec for data originating from the Si
FTP Server, (a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the
protocol extension.
SMtpte Mesa

bits/sec

• packets/sec

112.027

42.97

129.876

9.81

Stas>feo2..

89,977

36.66
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33.84
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Table 5-6: Average throughput in bits/sec and packets/sec destined to the Si FTP Server, (a)
Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean

bift'eec

23.922

3.23

9.271

1.17

Simulation 7

34.067

4.83

39.674

6.00

13.36

Sanitation 8

29.998

4.00

16.717

2.16

13.74

.Simulation 9

31.384

4.69

14.689

2.49

106.838

8.91

Simulation 10

31.816

4.60
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141.294

11.84

Cross-Simulation
Sample Mean

30.237
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! 7 636
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42.72
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42.57
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Figure 5-3: Total bi-directional throughput between Ethernet Switch and Si FTP Server,
(a) Total throughput in bits/sec. (b) Total throughput in packets/sec.

Figure 5-4: Average throughput from Si FTP Server to Ethernet Switch, (a) Average through
put in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.
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Overall throughput for the remaining wireless stations actually slightly improved
when the protocol extension was invoked, as shown in Figure 5-6 and in Tables 5-7 and 5-8.
Average throughput rose from 3,586 kbps (479.37 packets/sec) to 3,766 kbps (528.16 packets/sec), an increase of approximately five percent. This indicates that the Wireless Nodes 1
through 4 had taken advantage of the Isolated Station’s diminished media-access efficiency.
The “Backoff Penalty" discussed in the Delay section is likely at least partially responsible
for this small increase in throughput for non-relayed traffic. It should be noted, however,
that even though non-relayed traffic enjoys a marginal increase in throughput, the loss of
throughput experienced by the Isolated Station when it is dependant on the protocol exten
sion is enough to significant to diminish overall network performance.
Figures 5-7 and 5-8 present graphs of both data throughput targeted to the FTP
Server, and originating from the FTP Server respectively. All of the additional throughput
Table 5-7: Average throughput originating from the FTP Server in bits/sec and packets/sec.
(a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) With the wLAN invoking the
protocol extension.
____________________________________
S u "* M „»
bte/scc
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bits/sec
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■
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262.441

19.81

S ta *tb n 7

588.848

213.02

191.530

25.65
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191.24
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19.47
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Sisolation 5

277.391

192.91

209.214

16.71
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Table 5-8: Average throughput destined to the FTP Server in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a)
Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Senate Mean
packets/sec

bks/sec

packets/sec

SimJatim 6

3.172.888

315.75

408.410

30.41

Sm&tion 7 . .

3.085.679

310.81

525.872

44.49

Simulation 8

2.940.423

307.62

521.144

35.74

Simulation 9

2,861,277

304.40

38.29

Simulation 10

3.133.950

315.78

491.365
!
___1
392.860

3.098.843

310.87

467.930
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Cross-Simulation
Sample Mean

(a)

Standard Deviation

bits/sec

(b)

36.06
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noted earlier is shown to originate from the FTP Server, with an increase to 667 kbps (217,29
packets/sec) during the frame-relay scenario, from 274 kbps (187.26 packels/sec) in the
non-frame-relayed scenario. Throughput traversing the Ethernet link in the other direction
decreased from 3,331 kbps kbps (292.11 packets/sec) to 3,098 kbps (310.87 packets/sec).
The link between the Campus Network and the Ethernet Switch is an excellent test
point to examine how efficiently the network is operating, since traffic from all of the FTP
servers and the wireless stations must cross through this link. As expected, the graph in

(b)
Figure 5-6: Total bi-directional throughput between Ethernet Switch and FTP Server,
(a) Total throughput in bits/sec. (b) Total throughput in packets/sec.
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(a)
Figure 5-7: Average throughput from FTP Server to Ethernet Switch, (a) Average through
put in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.
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Figure 5-8: Average throughput from Ethernet Switch to FTP Server, (a) Average through
put in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.
Figure 5-9(a), which plots the total throughput propagating through the link, appears simi
lar to the vvLAN global throughput graph in Figure 5-1(a), with overall throughput lower in
the frame-relayed scenario than the non-frame-relayed scenario. Overall link throughput
decreased from. 4,184 kbps (565.89 packets/sec) to 3,757 kbps (539.59 packets/sec), a loss
of approximately ten percent.
Tables 5-9 and 5-10 provide a breakdown of the throughput in both directions for
each simulation, along with a cross-simulation average for simulations which used the pro
tocol extension and those which did not. Figures 5-10 and 5-11 plots a history of through
put originating from and destined to the Campus Network, respectively. Data originated
from the Campus Network at an average rate of 3,805 kbps (315.14 packets/sec) in the non
frame-relayed scenario, and 3,096 kbps (315.14 packets/sec) in the frame-relayed scenario.
Traffic heading to the Campus Network was recorded to arrive at an average rate of 376
kbps (224."4 packets/sec) and 688 kbps (221.45 packet/sec) respectively.
Effects of the Protocol Extension on the Isolated Station
In the simulation, the protocol extension fulfills its task of enabling the Isolated
Station to establish a network session with the wLAN outside of the access point’s coverage
area. This is verified by both debug information generated during simulation execution and

Table 5-9: Average throughput originating from the Campus Network in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol
extension.
Sample Mean

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

bits/sec

packets/sec

bits/sec

pockcts'sec

Simulation 1

3.789.300

341.17

500,512

27.01

Simulation 2

3.819.605

341.58

475.972

31.49

Standard Deviation
packets/sec

bia'soc

packets/sec

bitt/rec

Simulation 6

3.196.829

318.99

408.229

30.48

SinxtJation 7

3.119.757

315.64

501.372

40.78

Smifctkm 3

3.803.292

340.51

453.085

27.64

Simulation 8

2.970.454

311.62

511.807

34.49

Simulation 4

3.768.208

338.95

461.628

32.80

Simulation 9

2.892.676

309.09

487.890

37.71

Simulation 5

3.845.790

343.56

355.374

23.07

Sinulatiori 10

3.165.797

320.38

386.098

34.82

Cross-Simulation
Sample Mean

3.805.239

341.15

449,314

28.40

Cross-Simlation
Sample Mean

3.069.102

315.14

459.079

35.65

(a)

(b)

Table 5-10: Average throughput destined to the Campus Network in bits/sec and packets/
sec. (a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol
extension.
Sample Mean

- bits/scc

Standard Deviation

bits/sec

p3ckets/sec

bks/sec

Simulation 6

628.302

219.39

231.084

19.53

Simulation 7

615.262

218.05

207.826

23.02

20.22

Simulation 8

768.506

224.86

321.456

17.78

21.05

Snufadon 9

826.754

226.01

297,194

21.48

packets/scc

pockcts/se e

Smiktxm 1

377.238

224.85

403.308

23.52

Smifct»n2
. .. •
-

356.263

222.90

295.984

19.75

377.532

225.09

319.301

428.109

226.53

262.608

I

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

bits/scc

packets/sec

343.564

224.36

226.131

14.80

S ta tio n 10

603.220

218.98

137.968

22.05

376.541

224.74

301.446

19.86

Cross-Szmhtion
Sample Mean

688.408

221.45

239.105

20.77

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-9: Total bi-directional throughput between Ethernet Switch and Campus Network,
(a) Total throughput in bits/sec. (b) Total throughput in packets/sec.
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Figure 5-10: Average throughput from Campus Network to Ethernet Switch, (a) Average
throughput in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.

Figure 5-11: Average throughput from Ethernet Switch to Campus Network, (a) Average
throughput in bits/sec. (b) Average throughout in packets/sec.

with the fact that in the simulations running the frame-relayed scenario, even though the
Isolated Station is outside of the WLAN NAP’s coverage area, it is still able to exchange
data with the Si FTP Server.
As expected from the previous observations, the throughput in a relayed network
session is less than the throughput ;n a normal network session, as shown in Table 5-11 and
Figure 5-12. According to the simulation results, the impact was an average decrease of
61,267 bits per second were passed up to the Isolated Station's upper layers. The average
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Table 5-11: Isolated Station’s throughput in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
S am p le M e a n

S ta n d a rd D e v ia tio n

S am ple M e a n

S ta n d a rd D eviation

bits/scc

bits/scc

bits/s©C

bifciAcc

S itu a tio n 1

86,832

125.646

Simulation 6

7,658

3.866

Simulation 2

64,608

51,281

Sknukttbn 7

19,323

52,632

S m itetion 3

7 7,546

87,761

Simuiofion 8

10.408

9.132
19.397

Simulation 4

103,454

81,752

S initiation 9

17,541

Simulation 5

4 6.350

48,357

Simulation 10

17,525

37.752

S am p le M e a n

75,758

78,959

S am ple M e a n

14.491

24.558

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-12: Isolated Station’s throughput in bits/sec.
throughput during a normal network connection was 75 kbps, and 14 kbps when the proto
col extension was activated.
The delay experienced by packets carrying the data measured in the throughput
measurement was very high during the start of the simulation for the frame-relayed sce
nario. It quickly leveled out to an average of 1.07 seconds per packet. The long delay in the
start of the simulation may be indicative of the delay experienced by the first several packets
arriving from the Isolated Station’s upper layers while its MAC layer was negotiating a
relayed network session with Wireless Node 4 and WLAN NAP. Once the session was
established, the delay leveled out as seen in Figure 5-13. Delay for the Isolated Station in
the non-frame-relayed scenario started very low in the beginning of the simulation, and
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steadily increased with time. It eventually exceeded the delay associated with the activation
of the protocol extension at approximately 40 minutes into the simulation, averaging 1.48
seconds per packet. The average delays for each simulation is available in Table 5-12.
Table 5-12: Isolated Station’s delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol exten
sion. (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Seconds

Seconds

Seconds

Seconds

S n u k tb n l

1.75

0.95

Simulation 6

1.17

0.44

Sinitaion2

1.49

0.68

Smilatbn 7

1.00

0.50

Simulation 3

1.41

0.71

Simulation S

1.11

0.44

Smihtion 4

1.14

0.64

Simulation 9

1.00

0.56

Smifetbn5

1.63

0.89

SirruSation 10

1.10

0.25

SomrJo Moan

1.48

0.77

Sample Mean

1.07

0.43

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-13: Isolated Station’s delay in seconds.
Recall that throughput, as defined by OPNET, does not include control messages,
including relay control messages such as the connection-setup and RFI messages. The
transmission of these messages would consume more bandwidth than indicated by the
throughput measurements. Table 5-13 presents the average rate of data exchanged between
the Isolated Station and its relay station from the Isolated Station’s perspective. Figure 5-14
illustrates this data exchange in graphs denoted in bits/sec and packets/sec. Relayed data
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arrived at the Isolated station at an average of 15 kbps (4.32 packets/sec); comparing this
with the throughput in Table 5-11, an average of 1.241 bits/sec of the incoming data stream
was consumed by RFI messages. The Isolated Station transmitted relayed data to its relay
station. Wireless Node 4, at a rate of 35 kbps (5.14 packets/sec).
Table 5-13: Isolated Station’s bi-directional relay traffic in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a)
Transmitted to the Isolated Station, (b) Transmitted from the Isolated Station.
Sample Mean

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

bits/sec

pnckets/sec

bits/sec

pnckcii/sec

Smdatfcm6

8.561

3.11

4,093

1.08

SmCation 7

20.782

5.10

54.836

8.04

Standard Deviation

bits/sec

packcWsec

bils/soc

Simulation 6

27.812

3.90

11.167

packets'sec
1.37

Simulation 7

39.576

5.82

45.615

7.18
2.59

Saratiation 8

11.527

3.88

9.686

2.10

Simulation 8

35.001

4.82

19.788

S ta*tfcn9

18,914

4.81

20,257

3.15

Simulation 9

36.388

5.65

17.248

2.94

Sinafctbn 10

18,875

4.73

39.181

5.15

Simulation 10

37.032

5.54

20.713

4.10

Cross-Ssrjuhtion
S'R'pkMon-;

15,732

4.32

25.610

3.90

Cross-Simulation
Sample Mean

35.161

5.14

22.906

3.63

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-14: Isolated Station’s relay traffic, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.

While no packets were discarded during non-frame-relayed scenario, there was an
average of 0.61 packets per second discarded in the frame-relayed scenario, even though the
protocol extension did not limit the number of times a relayed packet may retransmit. The
Dropped Data Packets statistic in OPNET reflects packets discarded due to too many failed
retransmissions, and packets discarded by the function wlan_higher_layer_data_arrival
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when the higher layer buffer has been filled to capacity. This indicates that the higher
network layers are passing down more packets than the modified IEEE 802.11 MAC layer
can transmit. Table 5-14 presents the average number of packets discarded by the Isolated
Station, and Figure 5-15 displays a graph of its packet discard history.
Table 5-14: Isolated Station’s dropped packets in packets/sec. (a) Without invoking the
protocol extension, (b) With invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard' Deviation

Packets

Packets

Packets

Packets
0.32

0.0

0.0

Simulatkm 6

0.52

Smihtkm 2

0.0

0.0

Simulation 7

0.71

0.34

Ssmfctbi.3

0.0

0.0

Simulation 8

0.05

0.36

0.0

0.0

Simulation 9

0.62

0.39

0.0

0.0

Simulation 10

0.57

0.41

0.0

0.0

Sample M ean

0.61

0.36

“

” 3.

:.

* * + ■ # * *

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-15: Isolated Station’s dropped packets in packets/sec.

The Hid Queue Size statistic, which measures the size of the queue which holds
packets that arrive from the higher network layers, gathered by OPNET supports this hy
pothesis. As indicated on Table 5-15, the higher layer buffer held an average of 0.40 packets
for the non-frame-relayed scenario, indicating that packets arriving from the upper layers
did not wait long in the queue before they were transmitted across the physical media. On

79

the other hand, in the frame-relayed scenario, OPNET reported an average of 35.81 packets
in the higher layer buffer that were waiting for transmission. Figure 5-16 indicates that the
queue filled rapidly and then leveled out, indicating that the queue was full for nearly all of
the time during the simulation. A comparison of Figure 5-15 and 5-16 suggests this rela
tionship as the packet discard rate increased sharply as the buffer filled.
Table 5-15: Isolated Station’s Hid queue size in packets, (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
S im p lr M»«n

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Packets

Packets

Packets

PackoO

0.48

0.15

Simulation 6

35.12

8.43

0.41

0.12

vVinxdatbn 7

35.46

7.54

S in ^ U » 3

0.34

0.14

Simulation 8

35.56

7.65

S in fc fe *

0.48

0.15

Simulation 9

37.30

9.11
8.20
8.18

M

i

S ta ta b n l

Sin»hlk>n5

0.35

0.09

Simulation 10

35.64

S .OTf e M . . n

0.40

0.13

Sample Mean

35.8!

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-16: Isolated Station’s Hid queue size in packets.
Media Access Delay, as defined by OPNET, is the total amount of time a packet that
was passed down from the upper network layers spends waiting in the higher layer buffer
and transmission delays resulting from media access contention. In the frame-relayed sce
nario, the average Media Access Delay increased from 0 seconds to 8.63 seconds. It is
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likely that both the filled higher layer buffer and the “backoff penalty” discussed previously
are responsible for this delay increase. The Media Access Delay statistical averages ob
tained from all of the OPNET simulations are available on Table 5-16. A graph comparing
the history of the Media Access Delay between the two scenarios is shown in Figure 5-17.
Table 5-16: Isolated Station’s media access delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the
protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.

Skro&ion1
SimAmn2
Stauhtimf
Smilstion3
1W.«

.Sunolt M«m
PMkefc
o.oo
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

StantMDavIaHqb
PnollMS
0.00
0.00
0.00
0,00
0.00
0.00

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-17: Isolated Station’s media access delay in seconds.

In IEEE 802.11, retransmissions are a natural response to missed acknowledgments,
normally the result of a frame collision. These retransmissions are measured by OPNET in
the Retransmission Attempts statistic. As expected, the relayed network session experi
enced many more retransmissions than a non-relayed network session. The average num
ber of retransmissions taken by the Isolated Station in a normal network environment aver

!J
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aged 207.12. When the protocol extension was activated, the number of retransmissions
increased to an average of 1,480.62. These simulation results are available in Table 5-17. A
history of this statistic for the first and sixth simulations is available on Figure 5-18.

Table 5-17: Isolated Station’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts, (a) Without
invoking the protocol extension, (b) With invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Attempts

Attend ft

Attempts

Attempts

232.21

57.99

S m fctbn

210.35

51.27

S t a ih fc 'ij

180.50

59.59

S t n * tb o 4

230.79

62.61

S ta ih * n 5

181.79

40.45

Simulation 10

1.317.44

265.51

Simple M e »

207.12

54.38

Sample Mean

1.480 62

331.36

Slnublion I

(a)

Simulation (,

1.522.66

357.25

Simulation. 7

1.477.26

293.88

Simulation 8

1.577.10

361.78

Simulation 9

1.478.65

378.42

(b)

Figure 5-18: Isolated Station’s retransmission attempts in number of packets (transmission
attempts).

Effects of the Protocol Extension, on the WLAN NAP
Since WLAN NAP is the access point for the entire wLAN, all network traffic must
pass through it either on the w ay to the FTP servers or back to the wireless stations. Be
cause of this, WLAN NAP is the busiest device in the entire wLAN as well as a potential
bottleneck. It was previously observed that invoking the protocol extension had adverse
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effects to the efficiency of the wLAN as a whole, although some stations took advantage of
the Isolated Station’s diminished throughput capacity. The access point’s performance is
adversely affected not only by the packet retransmission performed by the relay station,
WLAN NODE 4, but also by the method of operation which the protocol extension is de
signed. Like the Isolated Station, relayed packets transmitted to the relay station from WLAN
NAP must follow the protocol extension's algorithm, including the synchronous exchange
of relayed messages. Therefore, WLAN NAP suffers from the same “backoff penalty”
experienced by the Isolated Station. Because the access point is also responsible for pack
ets arriving to and departing from the access point, this inefficiency adversely affects the
WLAN NAP’s capacity to serve the rest of the wLAN.
With the WLAN NAP, throughput is data that the access point passes onto the Ethernet
distribution system; it is never processed by any kind of application executing on the station
itself. As observed in the previous studies of the effects of the protocol extension on the
Ethernet links, throughput decreased when the protocol extension was invoked. In the non
frame-relayed. scenarios, WLAN NAP received an average of 3,733 kbps from stations
associated with the wLAN. In frame-relayed scenarios, this decreased by 735 kbps to an
average of 3,001 kbps in the frame-relayed scenarios (refer to Table 5-18 to examine the
average throughput results between each individual simulation.) Figure 5-19 presents a
history of throughput through the simulation for both non-frame-relayed and frame-relayed

Table 5-18: WLA N NAP’s total throughput, m bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) Without mvok
ing the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample M e a n

Standard Deviation

SLnsdhirdBevktten
■... w.
' bfefec

S am p le M e s a

bits/sec

bits/sec

Simihtjcn 1-

3.717.620

496.398

Shruhticn 5

3.129.002

Simulation 2

5,747.916

470.46?

S m dtttrn 7

3.052,652

493.S8S

Simulation 3

3.731.780

448.597

Simufetion8

2.903.758

505.987

Simulation 4

3.696,876

455.730

Simulation 9

2.826.353

481.11!

Simulation 5

3.773.711

351.437

Simulation 10-

3.097.753

379.508

Sample M ean

3.733,580

444.562

Semple Mean

3,001.903

452.722

(a)

bits/sec

(b)

...

403,117
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Figure 5-19: WLAN NAP's throughput in bits/sec, comparing the throughput between the
non-frame-relayeci scenario and the frame-relayed scenario.
scenarios. These results are comparable to the data rates observed in the Campus Network
to Ethernet Switch link. The difference of two percent between the wLAN NAP throughput
and the Ethernet link throughput is likely the result of rounding error in OPNET’s data
collection. The relayed throughput received by the WLAN NAP in the frame-relayed sce
nario was calculated to be an average of 29 kbps. This is similar to the rate of data trans
ported across the Ethernet Switch to Si FTP Server Ethernet link, with a difference of ap
proximately three percent between the two statistics. Table 5-19 provides the average re
layed throughput between the frame-relayed scenario simulations. Figure 5-20 historically
compares non-relayed throughput and relayed throughput in the frame-relayed scenario.
All relayed data messages, including the RFI messages, arrived at the WLAN NAP
station at a rate o f 30 kbps (5.15 packets/sec), as shown in Table 5-20(a). In comparison
with the renewed relayed throughput, approximately 1,466 bits/sec of this traffic is com
posed of relay-control data. WLAN NAP transmitted relayed data to WLAN NODE 4 at an
average rate of 17 kbps (4.32 packets/sec), as shown in Table 5-20(b). Figure 5-21 presents
a graphical comparison between relayed data transmitted and received by WLAN NAP.
In the non-frame-relayed scenario, the delay for packets received by the WLAN
NAP station was an average of 0.01 seconds per packet. In frame-relayed scenarios, the
delay increased to an average of 0.02 seconds per packet. These values do not reflect the
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Table 5-19: WLAN NAP’s total relayed throughput in bits/scc.
S im p le M e a n

S ta n d a rd D e v ia tio n

bfe/scc

b is /s e c

Sirrutotion 6

23,234

9,020

Simulation 7

32.993

38.438

Simulation 8

29.122

16,325

S im utatim 9

30,341

14,147

Simulation 10

30.795

17.080

S am ple M 'enn

29,297

19.002

Figure 5-20: WLAN NAP’s throughput in bits/sec between non-relayed and relayed traffic
in the frame-relayed scenario.
delay for relayed packets, which experienced substantially longer delays, averaging 9.49
seconds per packet. The cumulative delay for non-relayed and relayed packets in the framerelayed scenario was estimated at 0.11 seconds per packet. The simulation results on delay
for both the non-frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenarios are available on Table 5-21.
Figure 5-22 compares delay between non-frame-relayed and frame-relayed scenarios, con
sidering only non-relayed traffic (Figure 5-22(a)) and cumulative non-relayed and relayed
traffic

( F ig u re

5-22(b)). Table 5-22 and Figure 5-23 provides information about the delay

characteristics of relayed frames in frame-relayed scenarios.
A n o th e r

number
more

performance

o f packet

p a c k e ts

fa c to r

discards per

that suffered because of the protoco1extension was the

second.

per second after invoking

L ik e
th e

the Isolated Station,

W LAN NAP

dropped

protocol extension, rising from an average of
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Table 5-20: Relayed data in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) To WLAN NAR (b) From WLAN
NAP.
Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation
packeU/sec

bits/sec

packets/sec

bits/sec

Sirmlntx>n 6

9.210

3.11

4,716

1.08

Smjiition7

23.092

5.10

63.076

8.04

3.88

11.107

2.10

4.8!

23.281

3.14

4.73

45.262

5.16

4.32

29.488

3.90

btos/soc

packcts'gcc

bhs/wc

packets/sec

Sirn5»tion 6

24.354

3.90

9,405

1.40

SmilAtfcin 7

34,648

5.81

40,386

7.20

'•
|1.HUin <1
oxntuaoon
o

30,501

4.81

17,043

2.61

Simulation 8

12.401

Sinubtnn 9

31.944

5.64

14,953

2.98

Simulation 9

21.059

Simulation 10

32.370

5.53

18,169

4.11

Simulitioti 10

20.813

Cro«s*SimultttJon
Sample Mean

30.763

5.13

19,991

3.66

Cross-Simulatk»n
Sample Mean

17.315

(b)

(a )

^

am
r c m .t f M e« lv « 4 tp k tf /M C )
M l»y«< T iim ttt t i n t ( f k i t / t t e )

(b)
(a )
Figure 5-21: WLAN NAP’s relay traffic, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.
9.0 packets/sec in the non-frame-relayed scenario to an average o f 12.1 packets/sec in the
frame-relayed scenario. The average dropped packets rate for all of the simulations are
located in Table 5-23. Figure 5-24 presents a comparison of packet discards between the
non-frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenario simulations.
Like the Isolated Station, the number of retransmission attempts performed by WLAN
NAP was nearly tripled when the protocol extension was invoked. This statistic for all of
the simulations is available on Table 5-24, with a graphical comparison between the non
frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenarios on Figure 5-25. In the non-frame-relayed
scenarios, OPNET reported an average of 649.37 retransmission attempts, this number in
creased to 1,740.57 in the frame-relayed scenarios.
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Table 5-21: W LAN N A P's delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol extension.

(b) With invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

Seconds

Seconds

Seconds

Seconds

Simulation 1

0.01

0.00

Simulation 6

0 .0 1

0 .0 0

Smdatbn 2

0.01

0.00

Simulation 7

0 .0 2

0 .0 0

Sanitation 3

0.01

0.00

Simulation 8

0 .0 2

0 .0 0

Simulation 4

0.01

0.00

Simulation 9

0 .0 2

0 .0 0

Simulations

0.01

0.00

Simulation 10

0 .0 2

0 .0 0

SnmpJe Mean

0.0!

0.00

Sample Mean

0 .0 2

0 .0 0

(a)

(b)

(b)
(a )
Figure 5-22: WLAN NAP’s delay in seconds between non-frame-relayed and frame-re
layed scenarios, (a) Not including relayed frames in the frame-relayed scenario, (b) Includ
ing frames in the frame-relayed scenario.
It was expected that the other performance statistics would yield worse performance
when the protocol extension was activated. Throughput. Delay, and Dropped Packets for
the WLAN NAP, as well as Retransmission Attempts, all worsened in varying degrees when
the protocol extension was enabled. However, the remaining performance measurements
yielded slightly better performance when the protocol extension was enabled, such as the
Hid Queue Size and Media Access Delay. As shown in Table 5-25 and Figure 5-26, Hid
Queue Size actually decreased. In the non f...me-relayed scenarios, OPNET reported that
the average Hid Queue Size was 318.21 packets. In the frame-relayed scenarios, the queue
size decreased to 92.66 packets.

1
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Likewise, Media Access Delay plummeted from 1.48 seconds per packet in the non
frame-relayed scenarios down to 0.43 seconds per packet in the frame-relayed scenarios.
The OPNET results regarding Media Access Delay are available in Tabic 5-26, with Figure
2-27 comparing the history of Media Access Delay between the two simulation scenarios.
The improvements to Hid Queue Size and Media Access Delay are likely attributable to the
Isolated Station’s diminished network-access capabilities.

Table 5-22: WLAN NAP’s relayed packet delay in seconds.
S am p le M e a n

Standard Deviation

Seconds

S econds

Simulation 6

10.97

5.07

Simulation 7

9.62

4.40

Simulation 8

10.02

5.62

Simulation 9

8.27

3.52

Sanitation TO

8.57

4.08

Staatofe M ean

9.49

4.53

. .

Figure 5-23: WLAN NAP’s relayed packet delay in seconds.
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Table 5-23: W LAN N A P’s Dropped Packets in packets/sec. (a) W ithout invoking the proto
col extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
S am p le M e a n

S ta n d a rd D e v ia tio n

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

packets/sec

packets'sec

packets/sec

peekett/tec

8.06

2.23

S k rd a tb n 6

11.45

3.68

SmtSation 2

8.53

2.29

Ssmolatkffi 7

11.66

3.09

8.69

2.94

S butfatiw 8

11.28

4.25

Simulation 4

10.72

2.89

S r a iiti« i9

14.18

5.90

S im jlatjon5

9.02

Simulation 10

11.94

4.43

SantpJe M e a n

9.00

Sample M e in

12.30

4.27

2.55

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-24: WLAN NAP’s dropped packets in packets/sec.

Table 5-24: WLAN NAP’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts, (a) Without
invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
. S tottdjydB e vM M i

S a n * * M ean

S ta n d a rd B e v te tk ro

S«npfc M ean

P ackets

Packets

P ack e t:

Packets

Simulatkjn 1

647.33

87,04

S ta n k * * 6

1.667.87

204.72

Simulation 2

655,03

83.33

S m ih tio n -

1.757.22

229.42

Simulation 3

648.58

82.26

S im * tr a i8

1.749.14

Simulation 4

642.38

81.31

Simulation 9

1.777.71

Simulation 5

653.54

63.83

Simulation 10.

1,750.95

213.20

649.37

79..54

S am p le M e a n

1740.57

225.44

Sample Mean

(a)

(b)

207.29
|

272.60

89

Figure 5-25: WLAN NAP's retransmission attempts in number of packets (transmission
attempts.)

Table 5-25: WLAN NAP’s Hid queue size in packets, (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
S a m p le M e a n

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

S ta n d a rd D e v ia tio n

Packets

Packets

PsckcB
42.49

372.71

197.47

Simulation 6

103.41

318.42

143.18

S n u b tio n 7

105.27

46.31

302.92

149.02

Sm SanS

85.68

42.38

s k n iita -i

246.23

13&.34

S m ta b o O

72.30

28.33

S m ila is B S

350.80

188.25

S in u f tf e n lO

96.67

25.34

318.21

163.25

SwEftf* M e a n

92.66

36.97

Sim SitiM >2

(a)

Figure 5-26: WLAN NAP’s Hid queue size in packets.

(b)
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Table 5-26: W LAN N A P’s media access u d a y in seconds, (a) Without invoking the proto
col extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
S am p le M e a n

S ta m la rd D e v ia tio n

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

S econds

Seconds

S econds

S econdt

S ir o M c n l

1.75

0.95

Skrwktbo^

0.49

0.21

Simulation 2

1.49

0.65

S n uttfo n 7

0.50

0.22

S n u h tim J

1.41

0.71

Sfcrobtipn 8

0.40

0.20

S m ifedon 4

1.14

0.65

Siinufatbo 9

033

0.13

Sm *»K ] 5

1.64

0.89

Sbmbtwn 10

045

0.12

S ingfe Mean

1.48

0.77

Sample Mean

0.43

0.17

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-27: WLAN NAP’s media access delay in seconds.

Effects of the Protocol Extension on the Relay Station (WLAN NODE 4)
It was expected that WLAN NODE 4, serving as the relay station in the framerelayed scenario simulations, would experience a universal decrease in performance. This
is true for the most part, as all except two statistics yielded a light to moderate performance
loss. Although relayed packets passed along by WLAN NODE 4 were subject to the delays
and the “backoff penalty” discussed earlier, the small number of relayed packets passing
through the station limits its effect on the relay station’s performance. The Throughput for
WLAN NODE 4 increased significantly when the protocol extension was enabled, rising
from an average of 46 kbps in the non-frame-relayed scenarios, to an average of 159 kbps
in the frame-relayed scenarios. This increase in data passed to the station’s higher layers is
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Table 5-27: W LAN NODE 4 ’s throughput in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension (does not include relayed data.)
Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standard Deviation

S am p le M e a n

b i t t 'K C

bits/sec

bfctec

Mv

S in * tb n l

29,510

36,818

Sfertiktion 6

153,285

109,401

Smihtion 2

44.501

62,103

Sm thtioft#

129.368

69.103

S tm lK b nJ

54,104

93.964

Simulation 8

168.721

101,189

Simubdon 4

54,365

57,472

Skrubtion 9

187.425

93,395

Simulations

50.520

67.074

Simulation 10

156.654

87.402

46.600

63,286

S am ple M e a n

159.090

92,098

Sample M ta u

(a)

ik

(b)

Figure 5-28: WLAN NODE 4’s throughput in bits/sec.
likely the effect of the station taking advantage of the Isolated Station’s diminished network
access efficiency. Table 5-27 presents the average Throughput for each OFNET simulation
as well as the calculated averages between the two scenario types. Figure 5-28 presents a
graph portraying the history of throughput between the non-frame-relaved and frame-re
layed scenarios.
Delay was the other measurement which reported an improvement when the proto
col extension was invoked. As shown in Table 5-28 and in Figure 5-29, delay decreased
from an average of 1.54 seconds per packet in non-frame-relayed scenarios, to 0.44 seconds
per packet in frame-relayed scenarios.
On average, more packets were dropped when the protocol extension was enabled.
In the non-frame-relayed scenarios, almost nc packets were discarded; this increased to an
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Tabic 5-28: W LAN NODE 4 ’s delay in seconds, (a) W ithout invoking the protocol exten
sion. (b) Invoking the protocol extension (does not include relayed data.)

Shutukifi h

Sample M ean

S tafford Deviation

Sample M ean

Standard Deviation

Seconds

Second*

Second!

Second!

1.75

0.95

S m iM b n ;

1.49

0.68

Sm Jolix. S

1.41

0.71

SimdMion 9

1.14

0.65

S ta ih d rn iO

1.64

0.89

S a in t* Moan

1.48

0.77

Sinikbo-. *

0.50

0.21

0 51

0.22

0 40

0.20

0.34

0.13

S tatafo ft 10

0.46

0.12

S#»npk Mean

0 44

0.17

Sfatitofeert

(a)

(b)

Figure 5-29: WLAN NODE 4’s delay in seconds.
average of 0.39 packets per second in the frame-relayed scenarios. Table 5-29 provides the
average number Dropped Packets reported by OPNET. Figure 5-30 presents a history of
packet discards throughout the simulation of both scenarios.
The Hid Queue Size moderately increased when the protocol extension was en
abled. Although the size of the queue nearly quadrupled, the average increase was approxi
mately 1.75 packets, significantly less than that experienced by both the Isolated Station
and WLAN NAP. As shown in Table 5-30, the average Hid Queue Size increased from 0.68
packets in non-frame-relayed scenarios, to an average of 2.43 packets in frame-relayed sce
narios (see Figure 5-31 for a history' of this statistic for both simulation scenarios.)
Media Access Delay increased by a very small amount between the non-frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenarios. OPNET reported almost no measurable Media Ac-
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Table 5-29: W LAN NODE 4 ’s dropped packets in packets/sec. (a) Without invoking the
protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample M ean

Standard Deviation

Sample Mean

Standatd Devlstlen

packetVsec

packots/sec

Seconds

Seconds

0.00

0 02

Stouhtioa C

0.23

0.33

0.00

0.07

Swfcbtwo 7

0.31

0.46

0.02

Sjm ktioa 8

0.24

0.39

0.00

Simulation
Simulation 4

0.01

0.06

Sknul»tjoo9

0.71

0.77

Sorulfttinn 5

0.00

0.00

Stafctfca 10

0.49

0.49

Samjrfe Mean

0.00

0.03
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Figure 5-30: WLAN NODE 4 ’s dropped packets in packets/sec.
cess Delay in the non-frame-relayed scenarios; in the frame-relayed scenarios it increased
to an average of 0.01 seconds per packet, indicating that in both scenarios, WLAN NODE 4
did not have a very long wait when attempting to access the wireless media. Table 5-31
presents the results OPNET gathered regarding Media Access Delay. Figure 5-32 shows a
history of the Media Access Delay throughout both simulations.
While the number of Discarded Packets, the Hid Queue Size, and the Media Access
Delay increased in small amounts, the number of retransmissions increased drastically when
the protocol extension was enabled. In the non-frame-relayed scenarios, OPNET reported
an average of 292.93 retransmission attempts. In the frame-relayed scenarios, the number
of retransmission attempts rose to an average of 534.00, an increase of 82%. A history of
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Table 5-30: W LAN NODE 4 ’s Hid queue size in packets, (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-31: WLAN NODE 4’s Hid queue size in packets.
packet discards between the two scenarios is available in Figure 5-33. The average retrans
missions for each scenario as reported by OPNET may be found in Table 5-32.
The rate

of

relayed data passing through the relay station has been measured in a

number of customized statistics. Frames Relayed to Ax (Sxi) measures the amount of data
which the relay station forwarded to the access point. Frames Relayed to Si (Sxi) measures
the amount o f data which the relay station forwarded to all Isolated Stations with which the
relay station has established a relayed network session. In the configuration denoted in
Chapter 4, this statistic measures the amount o f data relayed to the Isolated Station. Relayed
Frames Received (Sxi) measures the amount
originating

fro m

of

relayed data received by the relay station,

both the access point and all isolated stations which have a relayed net-
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Tabic 5-31: W LAN NODE 4 ’s media access delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the
protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-32: WLAN NODE 4 ’s media access delay in seconds.
work session established through the relay station. All o f these statistics are measured in
both bits/sec and packets/sec.
In the frame-relayed scenarios, data from the Isolated Station and WLAN NAP (in
cluding any and all RFI messages) arrived at WLAN NODE 4 at a rate of 46 kbps (9.46
packets/sec.) O f that incoming data, 30 kbps (5.13 packets/sec) were forwarded to WLAN
NAP, and the remaining 15 kbps 0.32 packets/sec) were forwarded to the Isolated Station.
Figure 5-34 provides a history of data arriving at WLAN NODE 4. In Figure 5-35, the
history of the amount of data forwarded to WLAN NAP and Isolated Station is displayed.
Tables 5-33 and 5-34 present the averaged results from the OPNET simulations regarding
incoming and outgoing relay data, respectively.
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Table 5-32: WLAN NODE 4’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts, (a) Without
invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-33: WLAN NODE 4’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts.

Table 5-33: WLAN NODE 4 ’s relayed frames received in bits/sec and packets/sec
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Figure 5-34: WLAN N 0 D E 4 ’s relayed frames received, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.

Table 5-34: WLAN NODE 4’s relayed frames sent in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) To WLAN
NAP. (b) To Isolated Station.
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Figure 5-35: WLAN NODE 4’s relayed frames sent, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.
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Effects of the Protocol Extension on WLAN NODEs 1 through 3’s Traffic
In the OPNET simulation, three wireless stations were not involved in the protocol
extension operation. All three stations were included in the wLAN to facilitate observation
of the side effects of the additional overhead incurred by message relaying. One station,
WLAN NODE 1, was positioned on the opposite side of the WLAN from the Isolated
Station; the only relayed traffic that it could possibly receive is that which originates from
WLAN NAP. WLAN NODE 2 is positioned in such a way that it receives relayed traffic
from WLAN NAP and WLAN NODE 4, but no transmissions from the Isolated Station.
The last wireless station, WLAN NODE 3. is positioned in such a way that it can receive
messages from all three participants in the protocol extension. Because certain stations are
farther away from relayed messaging sources, they experience a lower level of blocking,
meaning they have less media access contention to deal with.
The effects of the protocol extension on throughput were varied. WLAN NODE 1
experienced a decrease in throughput from 43 kbps in non-frame-relayed scenarios down to
37 kbps in frame-relayed scenarios, a loss of nearly 14%. On the other hand, the throughput
for WLAN NODE 2 increased from 48 kbps in non-frame-relayed scenarios to 173 kbps in
frame-relayed scenarios, and WLAN NODE 3 likewise increased from 48 kbps to 145
kbps. The average throughput for each station in all simulations is available in Table 5-35.
A history of these stations’ throughput performance may be reviewed in Figure 5-36.
Between each station in their respective scenario configurations, Delay was nearly
uniform. In the non-frame-relayed scenario, the delay averaged at 1.48 seconds per packet
for WLAN NODE 1 and 2, and 1.49 seconds per packet for WLAN NODE 3. In the framerelayed scenario, delay actually decreased. OPNET reported a delay of 0.43 seconds per
packet for WLAN NODEs 1 and 2, and 0.44 for WLAN NODE 3. The averages for each
simulation is available in Table 5-36. A graph for each scenario is displayed in Figure 5-37.
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Tabic 5-35: W LAN NODEs 1-3 throughput in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-36: WLAN NODEs 1-3 throughput in bits/sec with and without invoking the
protocol extension, (a) WLAN NODE 1. (b) WLAN NODE 2. (c) WLAN NODE 3.
The most likely cause for this delay uniformity is because the packets with which
the delay is measured from originated at the WLAN NAP. Since the WLAN NAP is at the
center of the wLAN (excluding any isolated stations), each of these packets face equal
network access contention regardless of its destination.
These statistics provide insight on how efficiently data is arriving to the WLAN
NODE stations from WLAN NAP, but provide little information about the stations’ ability
to transmit messages. To measure the effect of the protocol extension’s impact on these
stations’ ability to transmit packets, the Number of Retransmissions each station must pur
sue to transmit a packet was examined. The results of the simulations regarding the number
of retransmission attempts may be reviewed in Table 5-37 and in Figure 5-38. WLAN
NODE 1, the station furthest away from the relaying traffic, experienced an average in-
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Table 5-36: W LAN NODEs 1-3 delay in seconds, (a) W ithout invoking the protocol exten
sion. (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-37: WLAN NODEs 1-3 delay in seconds with and without invoking the protocol
extension, (a) WLAN NODE 1. (b) WLAN NODE 2. (c) WLAN NODE 3.
crease in its number o f retransmissions, rising from 290.90 in the non-frame-relayed sce
narios to 369.81 in the frame-relayed scenarios, an increase of 27%. WLAN MODE 2,
which is closer to the relay network activity, increased from 312.37 retransmissions to 439.32,
an increase of 40%. The final station, which has to contend for media access with each
relayed message transmitted through the wLAN, had increased from 306.40 retransmis
sions to 496.23, an increase of 61%. This data provides proof that other stations not in
volved in the protocol extension experience worse performance the closer the station is
located to the Isolated Station.
Effects of RTS/CTS on the Protocol Extension
All of the simulations previously discussed were executed without utilization of the
RTS/CTS provided by IEEE 802.11. Recall from Chapter 3 that RTS/CTS is the mecha-
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Table 5-37: W LAN NODEs 1-3 retransmission attempts in num ber o f attempts, (a) With
out invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-38: WLAN NODEs 1-3 retransmission attempts in number of attempts with and
without invoking the protocol extension, (a) WLAN NODE 1. (b) WLAN NODE 2. (c)
WLAN NODE 3.
nism implemented by IEEE 802.11 to allow a station to reserve the wLAN’s bandwidth
long enough to transmit a message, rationalizing that the retransmission of RTS/CTS pack
ets is cheaper and are more likely to avoid collision than potentially very long data packets.
To analyze the effects of RTS/CTS on the protocol extension, simulations one and six were
executed with RTS/CTS enabled with a threshold of 256 octets. The results of these simu
lations are presented in graphs in Figures 5-39, 5-40, and 5-41. A NIL Packet Pointer error
which occurred in the RTS/CTS-enabied version of the frame-relayed scenario caused ex
ecution to terminate two-thirds the way through the simulation. Even though the simulation
did not finish, the performance comparison strongly shows the improvement enjoyed by the
frame relay protocol extension.
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It was found that although global performance worsened for each scenario when
RTS/CTS was enabled, the protocol extension benefitted immensely. In the non-framerelayed scenario, throughput decreased from 3,991 kbps when RTS/CTS was disabled to
3,879 kbps when RTS/CTS was enabled. In the frame-relayed scenario, throughput de
creased from 3,607 kbps to 3,356 kbps. Relayed throughput, on the other hand, enjoyed an
increase of 95 kbps (416%) with the activation of the RTS/CTS mechanism, increasing
from 30 kbps to 125 kbps., Delay for relayed data also improved significantly, dropping

Figure 5-39: Global throughput for the wLAN in bits/sec with and without RTS/CTS en
abled. (a) Without invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.

Figure 5-40: Global relayed throughput for the wLAN in bits/sec with and without RTS/
CTS enabled.
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from 6.59 seconds per packet to 1.51 seconds per packet. These results clearly show that
the use of the RTS/CTS mechanism was significantly beneficial to the protocol extension.
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Figure 5-41: Global relayed delay for the wLAN in seconds with and without RTS/CTS
enabled.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

Conclusion
In this thesis, a method to increase the coverage area of a wireless LAN through the
modification of existing wireless LAN protocols was proposed. The proposed protocol
extension does not require additional hardware to an existing wLAN as long as the original
MAC and Physical layers meet specific requirements. The structure of the protocol exten
sion as it is defined in Chapter 2 does, however, require the inclusion of new data structures,
timers, counters, and executable code, all of which are inserted into either the firmware or
the device driver. Several new relay-specific message types are introduced, each respon
sible for carrying authentication, connection-setup, connection-termination, and data ex
change information, depending on the state of the system. The issue of security between the
isolated station and the access point was considered in the design of the protocol extension.
Both public-key and symmetric algorithms are incorporated to encrypt and protect mes
sages exchanged between the access point and the isolated station. This ensures that an
attacker cannot either establish a relayed network session pretending as another wireless
station, nor can an attacker alter the origination, destination, or the contents of relayed data.
To prove that the protocol extension is functionally complete, an existing interna
tional wireless LAN standard, IEEE 802.11. was chosen to receive the modifications to
support the functionality defined by the protocol extension. It should be noted that IEEE
802.11 satisfactorily meets all of the requirements demanded by the proposed protocol ex
tension. To implement the updated version of IEEE 802.11 and to measure its effects on
104
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performance in a controlled environment, an existing model of IEEE 802.11 supplied in
OPNET 7.0.B vvas modified and tested. A test bed of ten simulations were executed, five
which did not employ the protocol extension, and five which did. The results of each group
of simulations were averaged together to produce a sample mean to better approximate the
true performance of the protocol extension. A separate simulation involving the use of the
RTS/CTS mechanism was also performed.
The protocol extension did impact performance, as was expected. However, the
results of the simulation showed that the impact was much more severe than expected. The
protocol extension did allow an isolated station to exchange data between itself and the
access point through a relay station. It effectively increased the access point’s coverage
area, but the performance loss was much more severe than expected. Although the wLAN
as a whole experienced only a moderate amount of throughput loss, the isolated station
experienced a throughput loss of as much as 91%, and delays of as long as six seconds. This
clearly shows that this protocol extension is currently not feasible for any type of real-time
or throughput-intensive applications. The protocol extension was also proven to have ad
verse effects to the other wireless stations associated with the wLAN, with performance
worsening with the increasing reception of relayed messages.
It was also shown that relayed throughput improved considerably with the inclusion
of IEEE 802.11 ’s RTS/CTS mechanism. Although overall throughput for the wLAN expe
rienced slightly worse performance, relayed throughput increased by as much as 400%,
while relayed message delay decreased by a similar ratio. The use of RTS/CTS clearly aids
the Isolated Station in eliminating much of the retransmissions, and hence the “backoff
penalty” which significantly diminished its effectiveness in all of the previous trials.
Future Research
Although this protocol extension is functionally complete, there remains much to it
which could be improved. Throughput and performance was found to be a major issue

106

which must be improved. Although collision-avoidance/contention-relief mechanisms such
as RTS/CTS. may improve performance, it still would not undo the bottleneck which occurs
when RDFO messages wait at the relay station for the RFI message to push the messages
forward to the end station.
The synchronous structure of the protocol extension also lends itself to inefficiency.
Because the RFI message contains descriptor data about RDFO messages which arrived
ahead of itself, relayed messages must not be lost or discarded. This leads to potentially
long backoff timers which serve to reduce throughput and increase delay to levels such that
the destination might have timed out and issued a retransmission request, which would
further decrease throughput as observed by the application. Clearly, if the processing of the
RFI message can handle RDFO messages which were discarded rather thar forcing an un
limited number of retransmissions, throughput should increase and delay should decrease.
Even though ample security is provided between the access point and the isolated
station, the relay station is still the weakest link in a relayed network session. Since the
isolated station is likely to be outside the transmission range of a centralized public-key
repository', it is not feasible to assume that the isolated station can have the public key for
every potential relay station it may attempt to contact. Therefore, there is no encryption or
digital signatures to protect the relay station from being the source or target of certain types
of attack.
One type of attack is on the TRS message, which lacks any authentication whatso
ever to determine who transmitted the message. So, it is possible for any attacker to spoof
the message, yielding a termination of the connection setup phase or the relayed network
service phase. The unique identifiers present in the RFI message which are not protected by
a digital signature are also vulnerable to attack.
During the relayed network service phase, the only control message exchanged be
tween the isolated station and the access point is the RFI message. Other control messages
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may be added to the protocol extension to introduce new functionality. A good example
would be a means for the transport of new session digital signature keys, which would oe
periodically regenerated during the life of the relayed network session. Frequently chang
ing the digital signature during the life of the relayed connection would increase the diffi
culty for attackers to gather enough plaintext to try break the digital signature key.
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CHAPTER VII
RELATED LITERATURE

Other Methods to Increase the Wireless LAN Coverage Area
In addition to the software-based Relayed Frame Protocol Extension presented in
this study, there exists hardware-based alternatives to increase a wireless LAN’s coverage
area. These devices, called Extension Points, are dedicated stations, which are added to an
existing wireless LAN. There are at least two models of Extension Points currently avail
able on the market.
One of these Extension Points is manufactured by Proxim, Inc., the RangeLAN2
7540 Series Extension Point. It increases the size of the coverage area without sacrificing
performance (as observed in Chapter 5) through the intelligent use of MISS. by using a
hopping code that is orthogonal to the code used by the primary wireless LAN in the ex
tended coverage area. In addition, the extension point possesses two receivers and trans
mitters, so data could be in transit between itself and the access point, and between itself
and the isolated stations simultaneously. Proxim claims that the extended coverage area
could enjoy a throughput as high as 1.6 Mbps, considerably higher than the throughput
experienced by the Isolated Station in the simulation. [RaOi]
Another Extension Point which is available is the Orinoco Range Extender An
tenna, produced by Agere Systems (formerly the Microelectronics Group of Lucent Tech
nologies). It is capable of boosting the size of the open coverage area by as much as 50100% (and up to 15-30% with obstructions), depending on the number of extender antennas
which are added to the wireless LAN. [OrOl]
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Most of the time, the coverage area of a wireless LAN that provides access to a
wired LAN infrastructure is created by a cluster of cells. The coverage area of each cell in
the cluster is provided by an access point, which is connected to the wired distribution
infrastructure. All of these cells combined form an aggregate coverage area equal to the
sum of its parts. A wireless station may seamlessly travel across many cells. This seamless
transfer of network access between access points is called a handover. There are a number
of research involved in the study of the efficiency of these network of cells, and many
proposed algorithms to increase performance and handover efficiency.
For example, in [MiH96], a handover mechanism for intra-switch handovers for
wireless ATM was discussed. The proposed handover mechanism is compatible with ATM
cell relay principles and supports the quality of service requirements of multimedia ser
vices. An overview of the architecture of wireless ATM was discussed to familiarize the
reader with the environment for which the handover mechanism is designed. In addition,
the internal workings of the proposed handover mechanism and many of the issues which
had to be overcome were explored in detail. For proof of concept, and to measure perfor
mance metrics, the handover mechanism was modeled in a simulation using Ptolemy, a
public domain simulation tool.
In [Ch96], Chai-Keong Toh introduced a hybrid handover protocol which groups
together several wireless ATM cells to form a larger macrocell in a Multi-' ler Wireless Cells
Clustering Architecture. The goal of the architecture is to increase the speed of the handover
process and to reduce the amount of messaging required to complete the process. Each cell
within a macrocell is connected to a shared cluster switch which functions as the handover
management entity, resulting in fast and highly efficient handovers in intra-cluster migra
tions. The macrocells are interconnected with the backbone network, with inter-cluster
migrations being slower and less efficient than intra-cluster migrations. Design issues, such
as locality exploitation, radio hints, resource reuse, scalability, mobile quality of service.
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disruption time, cell loss & sequencing, mobile station motion behavior, data looping, ro
bustness, and queueing were all addressed in this research.
All of the research discussed up to this point focused on a wireless LAN architecture
which is connected to a wired distribution infrastructure. The Frame Relaying Protocol
Extension and Extension Point devices increase the coverage area of a single access point,
which itself is connected to a wired network. The handover mechanisms presented all use
access points which are also similarly connected. Networks which are completely devoid
of any wired infrastructure or central administration are called ad hoc networks. [Ge99]
Typically, in an ad hoc network, wireless stations communicate directly with one another in
a “cloud” of wireless stations. However, it is possible that in a large ad hoc wireless net
work, there could be two stations that wish to exchange data with each other, but are outside
of each other’s transmission ranges. This problem gives rise to the need for an ad hoc
routing protocol
In [BoM99], Bose, Morin, Stojmenovi'c, and Urrutia discussed several algorithms
for routing, broadcasting and geocasting in an ad hoc wireless network environment. For
each algorithm, the ad hoc wireless network was modeled in a unit graph, where each wire
less station is a point in a plane, and stations may communicate if the distance between the
two of them does not exceed their maximum transmission range. None of the algorithms
require global information about the unit graph; each station is only aware of its neighbors
that are within its transmission range. None the algorithms require the duplication of pack
ets or memory at the nodes, and packet delivery to its destination is guaranteed. Two rout
ing algorithms, FACE-1 and FACE-2, are examined and proved mathematically to work.
The routing algorithms are then extended to produce two new algorithms: BROADCAST
(used when a oacket from an originating station is to be received by all member stations in
the ad hoc wireless network) and GEOCAST (broadcasting to stations within a region rather
than the entire wireless LAN.)

Many ad hoc routing algorithms are dependent on a connected dominating set. Since
the arrangement of wireless stations in an ad hoc wireless network is dynamic (stations can
and do power up and down, and move from one location to another without limitation), any
algorithm to calculate a connected dominating set that is used by an ad hoc routing algo
rithm must be fast, efficient, and able to cope with change. In [WuL99], Jie Wu and Hailan
Li proposed an algorithm which can quickly generate a dominating set for a given con
nected graph and is able to handle the dynamic nature of an ad hoc wireless LAN. They
compared their algorithm against those proposed in several previous third-party works (such
as the cluster-based algorithm, the approximation algorithm, and dynamic source routing)
in studies of algorithm complexity and performance analysis via simulation.
Other Research in Wireless LAN Security
In recent years, there has been an explosion of research in the fields of security and
cryptography. The importance of these fields continues to escalate as more and more sensi
tive information is transferred across networks, and as the public awareness of data security
continues to increase. The issue of security is even more important with wireless LANs in
comparison to traditional wired LANs, since invaders do not require physical access to the
network. The works of several authors are discussed in this section of the chapter.
In [PaG98], by Se Hyun Park, Aura Ganz, and Zvi Ganz, a method to provide secu
rity and orivacy for IEEE 802.11 is discussed. Their security protocol takes advantage of
IEEE 802.11 ’s Point Coordination Function, using the point coordinator as a centralized
controller to manage authentication and the exchange of session keys. The designers also
took into consideration issues which arise from the operating characteristics of wireless
LANs, such as low bandwidth, minimization of the security overhead incurred by the proto
col, low power consumption, noise and packet loss, and a computationally inexpensive
cryptographic algorithm. The publication concluded with a comparison of the proposed
security protocol with other approaches to wireless security.
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Another wireless LAN security protocol was proposed in “Secure Wireless LANs”,
by V. Bharghavan. This security protocol was designed to be implementable over any wire
less LAN technology whose operating environment meets a small number of assumptions.
Bharghavan’s security mode! differs from [PaG98] with the fact that it was designed specifi
cally for mobile computing, rather than the peer-to-peer connectivity in the wireless LAN
itself. In Bharghavan's model, a mobile station establishes a connection only with a Home
Computer, accessing the distribution system to reach this system through the wireless LAN.
This Home Computer is a trusted entity, a potential Home Agent [Pe97], and the Control
ling Authority for the exchange of keys between itself, the mobile station, and the access
point in the security protocol. The security protocol supports both authentication upon
power-on and upon handoff, each optimized to improve the protocol’s efficiency in both
situations. [Bh94]
Other Efforts in Wireless LAN Simulation
Simulations are cost-effective and powerful methods to explore the operation and
the performance of new protocols, algorithms, and arrangements of wireless LAN hard
ware. With powerful tools such as OPNET, the effects of changes to an existing architec
ture, which may be difficult to measure with real hardware, may be measured and examined
with relative ease. There exist, several studies that discuss the intricacies and the effective
ness of simulating wireless LANs.
In [BaDOl], by Rusty O. Baldwin, Nathaniel J. Davis IV, and Scott F. Midkiff, the
process they used to develop a simulation model of the IEEE 802.11 standard was dis
cussed. The authors state that the official IEEE 802.11 specification defines its protocol
operation in both text and in a formal specification language, SDL-92. The authors chose to
map objects defined in the SDL-92 formatted documentation to avoid the ambiguity which
could result from various interpretations of the text, to OPNET 3.0.B objects. This tech
nique significantly shortened the amount of time required to construct the model, requiring

113

only 250 hours to develop and debug. The internal design of the model and its validation
were discussed, including the fact that the model was an incomplete implementation of
IEEE 802.11, lacking encryption, authentication, power-save mode functions, fragmenta
tion, and the PCF.
A simulation of IEEE 802.11 \s asynchronous medium-access performance was re
searched by G. Anastasi and L. Lenzini. Instead of simulating the wireless LAN in OPNET,
like [BaDOl], the authors developed their own ad-hoc simulator in C++. The document
began with an overview of the IEEE 802.11 standard and its operating structure, then pro
ceeded to discuss the internal structure of the simulation. The topic of traffic characteriza
tion was the first to be addressed. Traffic arrived into the system through a Poisson and an
Interrupted Poisson Process. Packet sizes were calculated from a probability mass function
generated from data by previous third-party research efforts.
Next, the types of performance measurements that were analyzed, such as average
queuing delay, MAC delay, media access delay, and aggregate throughput, are explained.
The discussion then turned to evaluating the performance of IEEE 802.11 with and without
the use of the RTS/CTS medium reservation mechanism, proving that the use of RTS/CTS
improved aggregate throughput and average access delay. The effects of slot-time duration
were also addressed, proving that maximum achievable throughput decreases as slot dura
tion increases.
Finally, the performance of the IEEE 802.11 standard as the data rate increases was
analyzed. In [AnLOO], it was demonstrated that because of the fixed slot-time for all data
rates, IEEE 802.11’s effectiveness decreases as the wireless LAN’s bit rate increases. The
final analysis examined unbalanced load environments (compared to a uniform load by all
stations, a characteristic of all previous simulations), analyzing IEEE 802.11 ’s effectiveness
in a situation where the offered load from each member station varies. This analysis dem
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onstrated that stations with higher loads experienced very large queuing delays, on the order
of several seconds with moderate network loads.
In [Ru98], Leslie Rubinstein discussed a method to model cell site coverage pat
terns in OPNET through ray tracing techniques. The author stated that ray tracing is a
viable alternative of computing radio propagation since RF, like light, is affected by refrac
tion, penetration, and multiple object interrcflections. The use of ray tracing provides a
more realistic and complete simulation of the effects of objects and terrain on the propaga
tion of radio waves, and would not require the development of new modules to simulate an
environmental feature. Also, by starting the radio-propagation path trace from the receiver
rather than the originator, the simulation software was able to disregard all of the other rays
from the originator which would not be received by the destination, reducing its computa
tional load to only the subset of radio waves which do reach its intended target.
After discussing the problem domain and the proposed solution, Rubinstein dis
cussed the structure the OPNET model which takes advantage of this ray tracing technique.
OPNET’s radio pipeline was briefly discussed, surveying the changes to it that are required
to support the ray-tracing of radio waves. Data storage is another topic discussed, address
ing the issue of maintaining a database of the features of the surrounding environment (build
ings, etc.) in the model. Object descriptions were also addressed, including shape, size,
reflection, refraction, and transparency- Location of the source, destination, and objects and
the source parameters were also addressed.
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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY
Acceptance of Relaying Service - One of the new messages defined in the protocol exten
sion. The isolated station transmits this message to the station which it has chosen to serve
as its relay station.
Acceptance of Relaying Sendee Acknowledgment - One of the new messages defined in
the protocol extension. This message is sent by the relay station to the isolated station to
acknowledge that it has received the isolated station’s notification that it was chosen for
relaying sendees.
Access Point - A wireless station which senes as a bridge between the wireless LAN and a
distribution system.
Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session - One of the new messages defined
in the protocol extension. The isolated station sends this message back to the access point
to notify it that it had successfully received an RsRCS message.
Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session Acknowledgment - One of the new
messages defined in the protocol extension. The access point sends this message to the
isolated station to notify it that its ARCS message was received.
ARCS - See Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session.
ARCS_ACK - See Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session Acknowledg
ment.
ARS - See Acceptance of Relaying Service.
ARS_ACK - See Acceptance of Relaying Service Acknowledgment.
Association - The process of mapping a station to the distribution system through an access
point.
Authentication - The process of a station positively identifying itself to another, usually the
access point, during network session setup.
Ciphertext - Data that has been encrvpted.
Coverage Area - The total area that a wireless station’s transmissions may be received by
another station and is still intelligible.
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Frame - A synonym for a datagram, which is transmitted across the network media. In this
thesis, the frame refers to the MAC layer datagram format.
IEEE - Institute for Electrical and Electionic Engineers.
IEEE 802.11 - A wireless LAN MAC protocol, designed by IEEE.
Isolated Station - In this thesis, the isolated station refers to a wireless station which is
beyond the access point and wishes to join the network.
LAN - Abbreviation for Local Area Network.
MAC Frame Relaying Protocol Extension - Complete title of the protocol extension de
scribed in this thesis. Also referred to as ‘protocol extension’ or ‘frame relaying protocol
extension’.
MAC Layer - Medium Access Control Layer. This layer controls the use of the underlying
network medium. Is located in the Data Link Layer in the OSI Reference Model.
NAP - Abbreviation for Network

A ccess

Point.

Plaintext - Data that had not been encrypted.
RCD - See Relayed Communication Denied.
RDFO - See Relay Data Frame Class 0.
RDF1 - See Relay Data Frame Class 1.
Relay Data Frame Class 0 - One of the new messages defined in the protocol extension.
This data frame carries relay descriptor data in its payload, eliminating the need for an
accompanying RFI message.
Relay Data mame Class 1 - One of the new messages defined in the protocol extension.
This data frame does not carry relay descrintor data, and is therefore dependent on an ac
companying RFI message.
Relay Frame Information - One of the new messages defined in the protocol extension.
This message carries descriptor information for the RDFO messages transmitted ahead of
itself.
Relay Station - A station previously a s s o c i a t e d with a wireless LAN which agrees to pro
vide relay s e n d e e s to an isolated station.
Relayed C o m m u n i c a t i o n Denied - One of t h e n e w messages defined in the protocol exten
sion. The a c c e s s p o i n t sends this message b a c k to the isolated station, through the relay
s t a t i o n , to n o t i f y it t h a t a relayed n e t w o r k s e s s i o n h a s b e e n denied at the moment.
Relayed
sion. In

C o n n e c t i o n Establishment - T h e f i r s t phase of the frame
t h i s p h a s e t h e relayed n e t w o r k s e s s i o n is established.

relaying protocol exten
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Relayed Network Service - The second phase of the frame relaying protocol extension. In
this phase, application data is exchanged between the access point and the isolated station
through the relay station.
Relayed Session Termination - This is the final phase of the frame relaying protocol exten
sion. The process of dismantling an existing relayed network session takes place here.
Request for Relayed Communications Session - One of the new messages defined in the
protocol extension. The isolated station transmits this message to the access point (through
the relay station) to request a relayed network session.
Request for Service - One of the new messages defined by the protocol extension. The
purpose of this message is to notify all receivers that the broadcasting station is searching
for a station to serve as its relay station.
Response to Relayed Communication Session - One of the new messages defined in the
protocol extension. This message is sent from the access point to the isolated station through
the relay station, notifying the end station that a relayed network session has been granted.
Response to Request for Service - One of the new messages defined in the protocol exten
sion. A prospective relay station transmits this message back to the isolated station after
having received an RFS message and has decided to provide relay services to the request
ing stadon.
RFi - See Relayed Frame Information.
RFS - See Request for Service
RRCS - See Request for Relayed Communications Session.
RRFS - See Response to Request for Service
RsRCS - See Response to Relayed Communication Session.
Terminate Relay Session - One c f the new messages defined in the protocol extension. This
message is sent by one of the three stations involved in the relayed network session. Its task
is to notify the other stations that the relayed network session is to be terminated.
TRS - See Terminate Relay Session.
wLAN - Abbreviation for Wireless LAN.

APPENDIX B

FINITE STATE DIAGRAMS

This appendix features the algorithm of the protocol extension discussed in Chapter 2 in a
finite state diagram format (FAS). The purpose of these diagrams is to provide a visual aid
to supplement the detailed description of the protocol extension. It may also be helpful in
designing an implementation of the protocol extension, whether it would be in a simulated
environment or an actual implementation. Do not confuse these finite state machines with
those used in OPNET. The finite state diagrams in this appendix describe the algorithm of
the protocol extension, while OPNET finite state machines are an actual model implemen
tation of an algorithm, and are readily executable by the simulation software.
The first FAS describes the algorithm used by the isolated station in the Relayed
Connection Establishment phase. The second FAS covers both the Relayed Network Ser
vice and Relayed Session Termination phases for the isolated station. The third FAS com
pletely documents the frame relay protocol extension’s algorithm for the relay station, and
the fourth FAS documents all of the phases for the access point.
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Figure B-l: Finite state diagram for the Isolated Station’s relayed network session estab
lishment procedure.
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Figure B-2: Finite state diagram for the Isolated Station’s relayed network session data
exchange and session termination procedures.
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